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Crisis and Risk Communication Scholarship
of the Future: Reflections on Research Gaps
Brooke Fisher Liu1

and Jeannette Viens1

1. Department of Communication, University of Maryland College Park, College Park,
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ABSTRACT
Risk and crisis communication is a vibrant and growing area of research and practice.
As we head into the third year of publishing the first journal dedicated to crisis and
risk communication, the editor and editorial assistant pose some especially promising
areas for future research. In this essay, we also introduce the articles published in this
journal, including how they meet promising research gaps to fill.
KEYWORDS: risk, crisis, communication, research gaps

Risk and crisis communication is a vibrant and growing area of
research and practice. As we head into the third year of publishing the first journal dedicated to crisis and risk communication,
we pose some especially promising areas for future research. The
journal continues to accept all research related to risk and crisis communication, but we should think about how we can best
advance theory and practice through generating valuable, new
knowledge. As noted in the last editorial essay, reviewers for this
journal often criticize manuscripts for not advancing new knowledge (Liu & Stanley, 2019). The purpose of this essay is to start a
conversation about promising future research directions, rather
than generate a definitive list of research gaps. As you read, consider what you think the future of risk and crisis communication
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scholarship should be and submit that work to the Journal. We
conclude the essay with introducing the articles in this issue of the
Journal.
More Public-Driven Research
We first pose that we need more public-driven risk and crisis communication research. From situational crisis communication theory (Coombs, 2019) to image repair discourse (Benoit, 2018) to
typologies (Coombs, 2010; Lerbinger, 1997; Seeger et al., 2003),
crisis and risk communication research has advanced in a manner
that prioritized understanding how organizations should manage adverse events. The scholarship that emerged, while prominent and important, created an imbalance in understanding more
about how organizations manage crises instead of how members
of the public or communities manage crises.
Crises exist beyond the realm of corporations, governments,
and nonprofits, affecting real people, properties, and livelihoods.
Risks are integral to community members’ daily routines with
continued gun violence and climate change disasters, among other
risks. Scholars should extend their research beyond issues of reputation and repair, and find solutions for publics (Liu & Fraustino,
2014). The field needs stakeholder perspectives, not just descriptions of the nature of crisis responses. By shifting to a public-driven
approach, a plethora of significant questions emerge for the discipline to consider. For example, research has highly emphasized
cognitive variables and responses. Therefore, poignantly, the role
of emotion and affect in crisis and risk communication needs further exploration and confirmation (c.f., Jin et al., 2012). What is
the relationship among emotions, risk perception, and, furthermore, the important information-seeking and protective-actions
that the discipline strives to identify? As another example question for future research, how do publics communicate about crises independent of organizations? How does this public-to-public
communication affect outcomes like protective-action taking?
Interpersonal Risk and Crisis Communication
The field additionally needs to supplement intrapersonal communication knowledge with a more robust understanding of
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interpersonal communication in the case of risks and crises.
Understanding who communicates to who, when, and with what
messages has important implications. When it comes to risks and
crises, communication is not limited to organization-to-public,
but also includes public-to-public, as noted above. There is a need
to understand what is being transmitted beyond the formal channels, at what frequency, and to what extent. This may be especially
prominent in the era of social media where the plethora of online
platforms and personas have an influential stake in the communication of (mis)information.
Current Challenges
A third notable research gap is scholarship that addresses current
risk and crisis communication challenges. At the inaugural meeting of our editorial board in March 2019, members noted that it
is important to publish research that advances practice, and not
just theory. We have already published research in this journal on
some of the most noteworthy risks and crises of our time, including the refugee crisis in Europe (Johansson, 2018), the Ebola pandemic (Dillard & Yang, 2019; Sellnow-Richmond et al., 2018),
sexual misconduct on college campuses (Woods & Veil, 2020), and
the Fukashima Daiichi nuclear disaster (Kwesell & Jung, 2019).
We call for more research on such contemporary crises, advancing
theory and practice for 21st century risk and crisis communication challenges.
Inclusive Scholarship
Shifting to a public-driven perspective emphasizes the important question of who is being included versus excluded in studies.
Crises affect publics differently, especially publics who already are
vulnerable. Waymer and Heath (2007) explored this distinction in
relation to Hurricane Katrina, but it must be an essential consideration for additional crisis and risk communication research. How
are warning systems being used, updated, or critiqued on behalf
of disabled communities or language learners? How are protective actions being communicated to immigrants and refugees?
What do these communities witness, experience, and need when
it comes to crises and risks? Ultimately, there is a promising need
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for crisis and risk communication theories to be more encompassing and inclusive.
As scholarship considers a diversity of publics who face a variety of crises, the role of culture also becomes more prominent.
Intercultural communication is a vital part of understanding
crisis communication. Further developing the field may include
using culture as a variable in new and established models as well
as conducting cross-cultural studies. Diers-Lawson (2017) called
for scholars to broaden the voices heard in crisis research, to contextualize American research, and to promote more meaningful cross-cultural work. Crisis and risk communication research
needs to expand its horizons with a more global perspective that
better recognizes the work, theories, and differences around the
world. Such work includes crises that span boundaries, including
public health outbreaks.
Multiphase Scholarship
We also pose that research needs to expand its timeline focus as
the discipline continues to develop. Crises do not occur as isolated
incidents in a vacuum, soon to be forgotten by those whoexperienced them. Risk perception is not always the result of carefully
considered logic specific to each unique situation. These events
are not necessarily linear, so there is a gap in understanding as
to how crises proceed and take shape. In turn, future scholarship
can highlight various phases, whether the preparation or recovery
stage, and contribute to a stronger understanding of the nature
of crises. How do our existing theories work in different stages
of a crisis? Along those lines, scholarship needs to include the
long-term impact of crises and further explore the influence of
repeated instances. How do memory and recall of a crisis affect
communication, especially surrounding protective actions, in
other events? How are publics influenced in the case of frequent
repeated instances, such as areas with monsoon, hurricane, or tornado seasons?
The Current Issue
With these promising research gaps in mind, we now introduce
the current issue of the Journal. All five articles advance one of the
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research gaps noted above: advancing 21st century risk and crisis
communication challenges. First, Andrade et al. (2020) offer one
of the first published articles on the government’s failed response
to Hurricane María in Puerto Rico, focusing on the understudied area of rumor generation. Brown-Devlin and Brown (2020)
extend theory to understand how to manage sports-related crises,
an understudied area that frequently challenges sports organizations and their multiple publics. Brunson et al. (2020) introduce
a futuristic scenario to facilitate medical countermeasure communication. By taking on a contemporary crisis communication
challenge, this article illustrates how research-based simulations
can advance practice. Woods and Veil (2020) examine a legal
public relations case study related to sexual misconduct, thereby
providing novel insights about one of the enduring risk and crisis
communication challenges of our time. We hope that you enjoy
reading the articles in this issue, and that they inspire you to submit your own research to the Journal.
ORCID
Brooke Fisher Liu
Jeannette Viens

https://orcid.org/0000-0003-1985-8050
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ABSTRACT
This study assessed the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emergency risk communications following Hurricane Maria and the post-disaster information environment to identify factors that may have contributed to negative public perceptions of
mortality reports. Data included Government of Puerto Rico press releases, press conference audio recordings and Facebook Live transmissions, digital media news and
social media commentary, and interviews with Government of Puerto Rico personnel
and community stakeholders. Study findings indicate that inadequate crisis communication planning and training, coupled with information gaps and inconsistencies,
contributed to rumors around the issue of mortality. As a consequence, the Government of Puerto Rico lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing
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their credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust. Recommendations regarding
future preparedness activities and research are offered.
KEYWORDS: crisis communication, disasters, mortality, rumor generation

Hurricane Maria made landfall in Puerto Rico on September
20, 2017, as a Category 4 storm, causing widespread devastation
and becoming the costliest tropical cyclone in Puerto Rican history (Scott, 2018). Numerous challenges to disaster response and
recovery were exacerbated by multiple cascading failures in critical infrastructure and key resource sectors. Maria left millions
of residents without electricity for weeks to months, and entire
communities were isolated due to disrupted telecommunications,
blocked roadways, and flooding (Federal Emergency Management
Administration [FEMA], 2018). In this context, Government of
Puerto Rico officials experienced difficulty providing timely and
accurate information about hurricane-related deaths. Soon after
the hurricane, the official death toll was widely questioned given
the storm’s severity, anecdotal evidence, and studies by outside
groups estimating mortality of up to 72 times the official count of
64 deaths (Acosta & Irizarry, 2018; Kishore et al., 2018; Pascual
Sosa, 2017; Rivera & Rolke, 2019; Robles et al., 2017; SantosLozada & Howard, 2018). As evidence for a higher death toll
mounted, so did the public’s request for this issue to be addressed.
The George Washington University Milken Institute School of
Public Health (GW SPH) was commissioned by the Government
of Puerto Rico to conduct an independent study that included:
(1) an epidemiological assessment of excess mortality; (2) a process evaluation of disaster context death certification; and (3) an
assessment of the Government of Puerto Rico’s crisis and emergency risk communication (CERC), with an emphasis on mortality reporting to the public. Here, we discuss the third component,
with an overarching goal of identifying factors that may have contributed to controversy surrounding the death toll. To this end, we
assessed the application of CERC guidelines by the Puerto Rican
Government, in particular for public communication about mortality; examined the information environment in which mortality
was conveyed; and explored Puerto Rican stakeholder perceptions
regarding these communications.
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Literature Review
Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication
Communication with the public is a critical component of effective
disaster preparedness, mitigation, response, and recovery (Centers
for Disease Control [CDC], 2014; World Health Organization
[WHO], 2005). Effective communication in disasters requires
extensive planning and active management, and includes elements
to establish public trust through information source credibility
and transparency (Covello, 2003; Reynolds, 2006, 2011; Seeger,
2006; Steelman & McCaffrey, 2013; S. Veil et al., 2008). Effective
Media Communication during Public Health Emergencies lays out
six recommended steps for effective media communication, and
includes capacity assessment tools, such as the Internal Media
Relations Assessment Tool and an Effective Media Communication
Plan checklist (WHO, 2005). Further, there are guidelines in
the Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication (CERC) manual
(CDC, 2014), which outline principles of risk communication in
crisis, and details other considerations, such as planning and the
communication lifecycle; crisis stages; audiences, messages, and
channels; spokespersons; human resources; and working with the
media. However, the experiences of Hurricane Maria underscored
the limitations of these guidelines when communicating about
mortality after a catastrophic natural disaster.
Information Vacuums and Public Perception in Disasters
Regardless of established best practices and guidelines for communication, disasters present unique challenges given their inherent uncertainty, particularly in the case of catastrophic natural
disasters (Seeger et al., 2018; Tinker & Vaughan, 2010). In rapidly
evolving disaster contexts, facts can be elusive. Communicators
must have the capacity to adapt, especially when faced with limited availability of credible information, or an unmet “information sufficiency threshold” (Griffin et al., 2009; Seeger et al., 2018,
p. 197). In disasters, these information vacuums create opportunities for the public to speculate, make inferences to explain gaps,
question motives, generate rumors, or propagate unverified/false
information, in an attempt to reconcile perceived incongruences
(Hagar, 2013).

18

ANDRADE, BARRETT, EDBERG, RIVERA, SEEGER, ET AL.

In the absence of sufficient information, people tend to rely
on their perceptions (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006; Seeger
et al., 2018), as well as information sources they already trust and
familiar channels (Savoia et al., 2013; Wray et al., 2008). Given the
importance of public perception in disasters and the potential risks
introduced by information vacuums, CERC planning and delivery
should incorporate mitigation of any gaps between public perceptions and facts (Peters et al., 1997; Pornpitakpan, 2004; Ruggiero &
Vos, 2015). Nevertheless, while CERC guidelines address the correction of misinformation and misperceptions in the media, they
do not adequately address how information vacuums, a phenomenon that is likely to occur following catastrophic events, should be
handled by communicators after disasters.
Navigating the Disaster Information Environment
Inevitably, disaster communication exists within a larger disaster
information environment, compelling communicators to monitor
and interact with this environment (Savoia et al., 2017). An increasing number of studies highlight the impact that news media can
have on public perceptions and behaviors in crises (Eckert et al.,
2018; Parmer et al., 2016; Westerman et. al., 2014), demonstrating
its potential to be leveraged for its broad public reach and familiarity (Littlefield & Quenette, 2007; Reynolds & Seeger, 2005). Social
media networks have, in many cases, eclipsed traditional mass
media as critical disaster information sources. As a rapid, two-way
channel, social media has the potential to create disaster response
transparency, enhance situational awareness, facilitate aid delivery, and crowd-verify or eliminate rumors (Hughes & Palen, 2012;
Yates & Paquette, 2011). At the same time, not all disaster response
agencies have established capacities to monitor public reactions
and engage with stakeholders in real time through social media
platforms. Consequently, these information-sharing networks can
produce unprecedented challenges, such as the rapid propagation
of misinformation, contributing to an information environment
that can swiftly spin out of control (Liu et al., 2014). In these cases,
organizations leading disaster response risk losing their ability
to manage crisis messaging, potentially compromising response
efforts (Reynolds, 2011; Seeger, 2006).
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Communication of Disaster Mortality to the Public
A key issue of public interest following disasters is mortality, especially since it is crucial to informing response and recovery efforts,
policymaking, providing insight into population health status, and
creating a broader understanding of the disaster’s magnitude and
impact (Checchi & Roberts, 2005; Rickard et al., 2013; Salama
et al., 2004; Santos-Burgoa et al., 2018). Notably, mortality also
has the potential to become highly politicized following disasters
(Checchi & Roberts, 2008). Despite the importance of communicating to the public about disaster mortality, there is a scarcity of
research in this area, and currently no consensus, on best practices
for disaster mortality communication—it is here where the experiences of Hurricane Maria offer important lessons.
While disaster psychology and risk communication are established fields, efforts in the scientific and emergency management
communities to systematically examine how the public processes
and interprets disaster death counts or estimates are minimal. It is
reasonable to think that lay audiences and media outlets may experience difficulty understanding methods used to determine disaster mortality (Lagassé et al., 2011; Reynolds, 2011; Seeger et al.,
2003), which can be statistically complex and vary from one study
to another. Nevertheless, these methods influence how mortality
estimates can be interpreted given the assumptions and limitations
of each approach (Hammer, 2018; Sandberg et al., 2019). This very
scenario unfolded following Hurricane Maria, when the information environment became saturated with media coverage comparing the official death toll to numerous unofficial estimates, all using
distinct methods, time periods, and populations at risk to produce
mortality estimates (Sandberg et al., 2019). Yet, these death figures
were compared without considering these important differences.
Following Hurricane Maria, journalists and the general public
demanded that every lost life be counted, viewing this method as
the most valid method of truly knowing how many died (Checchi & Roberts, 2008). While it is appropriate to mourn every lost
life following such a tragedy, this information can be difficult to
obtain and verify in the immediate post-disaster period. This
expectation of having timely and accurate hurricane-related death
counts immediately following a catastrophic disaster represents a
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failure among scientists and communicators to convey the inherent superiority of excess mortality estimation over “body counts”
in complex disaster scenarios where surveillance systems and
death certification processes are disrupted (Checchi & Roberts,
2008). Currently, there is little to guide communicators in making
this distinction apparent to public audiences; while there is scientific literature related to mortality surveillance (Choudhary, 2012;
Farag et al., 2013; Kim et al., 2017; Rocha et al., 2017; Seil et al.,
2016) and documenting cause of death (Centre for Research on
the Epidemiology of Disasters [CRED], 2016; Lakkireddy et al.,
2004; Phillips et al., 2014; Wexelman et al., 2013), there is a paucity
of studies exploring the specific concept of communicating disaster mortality to the public. There is no literature base that examines how death counts from a disaster should be communicated to
the media, how to best explain information gaps that are common
following disasters, how death counts may evolve post-disaster, or
how to explain the science behind excess death estimates and what
we can or cannot infer from these estimates. This research gap
increases the likelihood that efforts in this area of communication
will continue to be fraught with challenges if not addressed.

Methods
To understand factors that may have contributed to the death
toll controversy, we used a multisource post-disaster CERC rapid
assessment protocol to examine Government of Puerto Rico communications and spokesperson media interactions, how these
interactions influenced the evolution of media coverage, and
stakeholder perceptions of mortality reports. CERC and WHO
guidelines informed the analytical framework described below
(CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005).
Data Collection and Analysis
We collected data from five sources. We systematically reviewed
17 Government of Puerto Rico press releases and 20 press conferences (10 Facebook Live transmissions, 10 audio recordings) for
the study period, September 20, 2017–February 28, 2018, to identify key messages and spokesperson delivery of mortality information (see Table 1).
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Data
Source
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Press Releases and Press Conferences
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria

Press Releases
(n=20)

WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health
Emergencies handbook:
https://www.who.int/csr/resources/
publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
Press Release Content Included:
(1) Key messages to the public; (2) Actions currently being taken;
(3) Actions that will be taken next; (4) How the public can help;
(5) Where to look for more information
CDC CERC manual guidelines: https://emergency.cdc.gov/cerc/
manual/index.asp adapted criteria, 9 Elements for Establishing
Trust and Credibility through Communications, p. 158; adapted
criteria, Spokesperson Pitfalls During an Emergency, p. 160
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health
Emergencies handbook, Steps of Communication in Crisis
Content and Spokesperson Delivery included:

Press Conferences
(n=17)

1. Expression of empathy (trust)
[Demonstrates empathy, caring, commitment—verbally and
in body language]
• When responding to a question or comment about loss of
any kind (death/injury) first expressed compassion, empathy,
caring?
• Acknowledged the validity of people’s emotions?
2. Clarifying facts/call for action (credibility)
[ What you know—in clear, key messages; Information is
accessible to all educational levels; Avoid professional jargon;
Information source expertise (education, role); Accuracy:
Accurate facts that have been confirmed; Consistency:
Consistent information]
• Delivered information in a clear manner?
• Used language appropriate for target audiences?
• Avoided the use of undefined jargon, acronyms and technical
language?
• Provided supporting facts for key messages?
• Used numbers, statistics and data effectively?
• Acted in partnership with credible third parties?
• Avoided going beyond the bounds of expertise?
• Made corrections quickly if errors were made?
• Provided consistent, coordinated information?

Press Conferences
(n=17)
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3. What is not known (trust/transparency)
[Acknowledgement of Uncertainty: What you don’t know—in
clear key messages; Explain why information isn’t available
for release]
• Acknowledged uncertainty?
• Discussed data and information uncertainties, strengths and
weaknesses—including those identified by other credible
sources?
• Clarified unknown information in a way that established transparency (“I don’t know” instead of “I cannot answer that”)?
• Avoided guessing/speculating?
• Provided a valid reason for not answering the question?
4. Process to obtain answers (trust/transparency)
[ What process you are using to get answers: explain steps/
required information]
	• Described the process required to obtain requested
information?
	• Explained what processes you are waiting for, circumstances
contributing to delays?
	• Supported and reinforced your message with visual aids such
as timelines or flowcharts?
5. Statements of commitment (accountability)
	• Stated commitment to acquiring and providing additional
information as soon as possible?
6. Information referrals/scheduled updates (transparency)
	• Provided guidance on where to obtain additional information
that expanded on key messages?

We conducted qualitative content analysis of press releases
based on the extent to which they included information on hurricane mortality in five areas (Maxwell, 2009) (see Table 1): inclusion of mortality as a key message (and consistency of provided
details); what was being done to assess mortality; what will be
done to assess mortality; actions the public could take to assist;
and where to look for more information. We also reviewed press
conference proceedings based on criteria drawn from WHO and
CDC guidelines (see Table 1). We assessed spokesperson delivery
and content to determine the extent to which these criteria were
met, thus contributing to the conceptual domains of trust, credibility, transparency, and accountability. For example, if spokespersons fail to describe steps being taken to determine mortality and
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provide vague responses about information they have about the
death count, this may compromise perceptions of trust and transparency among public audiences.
To assess potential information environment influence on
stakeholder perceptions of Government of Puerto Rico mortality
reports, we systematically collected and reviewed 172 English- and
Spanish-language digital media news reports and related social
media commentary. We collected primary sources of information
or stories from major U.S. mainland and Puerto Rican news outlets (e.g., CNN, Washington Post, New York Times, El Nuevo Día,
LatinoUSA, among others). News articles (n=53) and social media
posts were identified through web-based search engines (Google,
Yahoo) and social media platforms (YouTube, n=36; Facebook,
n=37; and Twitter, n=46) by systematically searching for predetermined keywords and hashtags (see Table 2).
TABLE 2

Digital Media News Reports & Social
Media Commentary (n=172)

Data
Source

Digital Media News Reports & Social Media Commentary
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
CDC CERC manual guidelines, Working with Social Media Before
& During a Crisis, p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emergencies handbook
(1) Reasons and timing of mortality reports; (2) Appropriate
use of statistics; (3) Contradictory mortality data from official
spokespeople and unofficial sources; (4) Information used to
classify death as hurricane-related; (5) Explanations and illustrations given for complex topics/processes; (6) Information gaps
filled by unofficial information; (7) Perceptions of the accuracy
and transparency of Government of Puerto Rico messages
regarding death figures
Keywords/Phrases: Death toll Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane
Maria Puerto Rico; Rosello death toll; Controversy death toll
Hurricane Maria; Deaths Hurricane Maria Puerto Rico; Muertos
Huracan Maria; Muertes Maria Puerto Rico
Hashtags: #PuertoRico #HurricaneMaria #puertoricohurricane
Maria #PuertoRicoRelief #PuertoRicoDeathToll #Hurricane
MariaDeathToll #HurricaneMariaDeaths
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Digital media data collection captured mortality information destined for the public as it was introduced or changed to understand
the chronology and information sharing dynamics. We conducted
qualitative content analysis of digital media news and social media
commentary to identify content in seven areas, related to domains
of trust, credibility, transparency, and accountability (Maxwell,
2009) (see Table 2). For example, if in response to a news article
suggesting that the official death toll was an undercount, the predominant commentary expressed the perception that the Puerto
Rican Government was hiding information that would discredit
their disaster response, we assessed that line of commentary to
express perceptions of (non-) transparency and a lack of accountability.
Interviews were also conducted with 33 key informants, including 11 Puerto Rican Government personnel and 22 leaders representing stakeholder groups, during a 2-week period in April of
2018. Interviews helped characterize actions and events related to
preparation and dissemination of mortality data, as well as stakeholder perceptions of the Government’s mortality communications. Government personnel participants held key positions
TABLE 3

Government
Personnel
Interviews (n=11)

Community
Stakeholder
Interviews (n=22)

Data
Source

In-Depth Interviews
Analytical Framework Source
Assessment Criteria
CDC CERC manual guidelines, Stakeholder and Partner
Communication, p. 241
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emergencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Perceptions of mortality reports—
in the domains of trust, transparency, accountability, credibility
(subdomains: expertise, accuracy, consistency)
CDC CERC manual guidelines, 9-step crisis communication plan and
process, p. 98; Working with Social Media Before and During a Crisis,
p. 268
WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health
Emergencies handbook
Qualitative thematic analysis, Accounts of mortality reporting
communication processes
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including heads of agencies or departments and communication
leadership or staff. Community stakeholder participants included
municipal mayors, community leaders, emergency responders,
police, faith leaders, health care providers, non-profit organization staff, and funeral home directors, which were selected to
represent all regions of Puerto Rico and exemplify a range of experiences given municipal diversity in socioeconomic status, political affiliation, demographics, and proximity to hospitals/clinics.
We conducted interviews that lasted approximately 1 hour using
a semi-structured protocol in Spanish. Interviews were audiorecorded and transcribed. Participants provided informed consent
and protocols were IRB-approved. Shown in Table 3, we deductively
and inductively coded transcripts using a procedure similar to the
qualitative content analysis described above, and analyzed coded text
to identify major themes representing participant response patterns.
Coding was accomplished using NVivo version 11 software. As such,
common and unique views and experiences among stakeholder and
government personnel participants were elucidated (Bernard, 2005;
Maxwell, 2009).

Results
Results are presented below, and organized into the following
thematic areas: (1) CERC planning and coordination undertaken by the Government of Puerto Rico; (2) handling of mortality information gaps by the Government of Puerto Rico; (3)
unofficial mortality reports in the information environment; and
(4) Government of Puerto Rico CERC capacity, including spokesperson performance. Perceptions of Puerto Rico stakeholders are
discussed throughout.
CERC Planning and Coordination
According to Government of Puerto Rico personnel participants,
a number of factors created difficult circumstances for the teams
responsible for CERC, mortality surveillance, and communication
of mortality to the public. These circumstances stemmed from the
devastation caused by Hurricane Maria, and also because a foundation for effective disaster communication was not in place. The
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Government of Puerto Rico did not have formal, written CERC
plans at the time of the hurricane. As noted in our interviews:
. . . there was nothing [for CERC plans]. We were preparing—we
had a couple of months saying this is what we need, these are the
work groups. We had everything set up, and then boom [the hurricane hit].—Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership
Was there a written emergency communication plan before the
hurricane? Not that I was aware of.—Government of Puerto Rico
Agency Communication Leadership

According to agency leadership, Puerto Rico’s emergency plan,
and municipal emergency plans, was appropriate for a Category 1
hurricane, but not a catastrophic event. According to one member
of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Leadership:
. . . the plans in Puerto Rico were not prepared for a Category 5
hurricane. The plans in Puerto Rico are prepared for a Category 1
hurricane, which is really what we are used to having in Puerto Rico.
So, now they have learned that the plan created many difficulties
because neither the people were prepared for this [hurricane], nor
the agencies either.

As a result, emergency plans did not include scenarios such
as multiple cascading failures in critical infrastructure and key
resource sectors, as specified in the Department of Homeland
Security’s National Planning Scenario (NPS) #10, “Category 3 or
Higher Hurricane.” Mass media channels were largely unavailable,
and Government personnel had not strategically planned to use
alternative channels, such as radio or interpersonal communication, to coordinate public health or disaster response efforts. As
various participants in our interviews noted:
We were almost completely incomunicado. There was only one
radio station.—Community Leader
There was one [radio] station that worked during the hurricane . . .
it was the only media that there was, no cellular, no television, no
electricity, and in terms of health information, on that station it was
very general.—Non-profit Organization Personnel
. . . let’s talk about leptospirosis. Well, I presented this issue directly to the Department of Health. There was no response to prevent
cases. That never occurred. —Municipal Mayor
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Finally, communication contingencies that were implemented
were inconsistent or ineffective. As one Municipal Mayor noted:
Communications? Bad . . . satellite phones didn’t work at all. I even
remember when the personnel came to our municipality to demonstrate how the satellite phone worked, and they said to me, “Mayor,
there’s no way. What you will have to do is use it after midnight.”
And I said, “What do I need it for after midnight?” I think that for
almost all of the mayors the satellite phone didn’t work.

The lack of communication capabilities post-hurricane
detracted from community members’ perceived credibility of
preparedness and response efforts. According to one community
leader:
For me it was surprising to see people from emergency management that didn’t have radio communication. I could not believe
that in the middle of a hurricane, the most important people in
Puerto Rico for managing disasters weren’t prepared. So, the worst
part of everything was the question of preparedness . . . really, for us
it showed complete ineptitude in this day and age . . .

These factors related to planning and infrastructure collapse
limited the Puerto Rican Government’s ability to coordinate with
municipalities and provide timely, reliable mortality information
to the public. On one hand, Government personnel who were
operating from the Center for Operations in Emergencies (COE)
described a highly centralized process for preparing information
destined for the public. This was reflected, for example, in the consistency between death counts given by spokespersons and press
releases. However, communication personnel also noted challenges and delays in coordinating mortality data with municipalities, again related to infrastructure collapse and inadequate plans
for effective contingencies. According to a member of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Leadership:
The problem with communication between municipalities and the
central government was that there was no way to communicate efficiently. At first, the governor had [someone] going to all the municipalities each day to communicate. A lot of information was delayed.
We were at the COE 24 hours and communication among us was
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continual. But, information wasn’t flowing from municipalities.
There should have been a designated liaison at each municipality
to communicate with the central government instead of one person
trying to reach all 78 municipalities.

Further complicating the communication of hurricane-related
mortality to the public was the establishment of the Department
of Public Safety (DPS) only months prior to hurricane season. This
was the new umbrella for seven agencies related to emergency
management, public safety, and forensic sciences. There are two
agencies responsible for handling mortality data in Puerto Rico:
(1) the Demographic Registry under the Department of Health
(DOH), which is the final destination for all death records, and
(2) the Bureau of Forensic Sciences, which is responsible for investigating any deaths suspected to be from unnatural causes, and had
been recently shifted under the DPS umbrella. According to study
participants, at the time of the hurricane, the transition to fully
integrate this newly formed agency umbrella had not yet occurred,
and this contributed to confusion about the delegation of responsibilities and processes underlying disaster mortality reporting. At
the time of the hurricane, there was no updated, written protocol
in place to coordinate release of information to the public between
the two agencies. Upon creation of the DPS, decision-making
changed for the timing and clearance of mortality data for the
public, and one respondent perceived that the formal vetting process had been compromised.
Emergency plans for events with mass mortality always have a unified command, where there should be periodic meetings between
the Department of Health, Bureau of Forensic Sciences, Department of Justice, Demographic Registry. Once the event happens,
these meetings take place to make the decision about what information was going to be shared with the public. When the Department of Public Safety was created, an office which still hadn’t been
well-formed, the hurricane came. There was confusion because it
wasn’t Health that disseminated information on mass mortality, but
instead DPS . . . I think that information . . . it didn’t pass formally
through the Executive Committee because the process was disrupted, and there’s another person requesting information, even though
it wasn’t through the official source.—Puerto Rico Government
Agency Leadership
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Stakeholder respondents perceived this lack of coordination
and protocol in mortality reporting as a DOH failure because
shifts in agency responsibilities between the DPS and DOH were
still not well-understood by community stakeholders. As noted by
some of our participants:
It seems to me there wasn’t a coordination protocol [for mortality
surveillance] with the Department of Health.—Municipal Emergency Management Director
I went back to the Convention Center and intercepted the Secretary
of Health, and I say to him, “Secretary, we have a situation with
death certificates.” I don’t believe the Department of Health was as
proactive as I expected . . . what he said was: “Go to the Center of
Operations and raise the issue.” We went there and we raised the
issue, went back two days later to search for a solution, but there still
wasn’t a solution.—Municipal Mayor

Handling of Information Gaps
Due to the devastation caused by Hurricane Maria and significant challenges to mortality surveillance, Government officials
did not always have sufficient information to provide the public.
Additionally, measures were not taken to explain these gaps or to
monitor and counteract the spread of misinformation. The hurricane-related death count was typically not a key message in press
conferences, and the Governor did not talk about the death toll
unless asked specifically, after which he confirmed the official count
in concordance with press releases or deferred to the Secretary of
Public Safety. According to a review of press releases, beginning
with the first official figure of six deaths on September 22, authorities clarified that more deaths were likely, but only those confirmed
as hurricane-related would be reported, vaguely citing “safety personnel” as responsible for making this determination.
Based on a review of press materials, media coverage, and
participant interviews, there was no overview given to the public
to outline mortality surveillance or death certification processes.
Spokespersons did not provide details or illustrations to facilitate
an understanding of how these processes had been interrupted,
and clarify reasons for delays or information gaps. As a member
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of the Government of Puerto Rico Agency Communication Leadership noted:
The public doesn’t understand the process for certifying deaths.
There should be a public awareness and education effort, and media
should help convey this.

Government communications provided minimal information
about the next steps they would take to ascertain hurricane-related deaths, and only two press releases on November 17 and 20
informed the public about what they could do to help.
Inconsistencies occurred in the provision of details for deaths
and unexplained increases in deaths. In press releases on September 24 and 25, October 11, 12, 14, 20, and November 1, 2017,
the Government provided specifics about causes and locations of
deaths. However, press releases from October 5, 10, and 29 did
not follow this format, and little to no detail was provided. After
almost a week post-hurricane, in which the death toll remained
unchanged at 16, the controversy over mortality count transparency intensified when, after the U.S. President visited on October 3, the Governor of Puerto Rico announced that the death toll
had risen from 16 to 34. This coincided with President Trump’s
comments about the hurricane’s limited impact, and also the
abrupt change in the level of detail provided about deaths in press
releases. Very little explanation was given to fill information gaps
regarding this abrupt increase. When asked about the doubling
death count on October 4, the Governor answered that the information they had before was insufficient, and that they are making
sure to only count deaths certified as hurricane-related. There was
no description of how mortality surveillance functions had been
compromised, and as they began to be restored, that the public
should anticipate a spike in mortality, a phenomenon known as the
“Burkle Effect” (Burkle & Greenough, 2008). It was not explained
that this is an expected occurrence following complex and catastrophic disasters. The unexplained abrupt increase in deaths contributed to perceptions that the Government was manipulating
death counts to avoid discrediting their disaster response, or evade
blame. In one community leader’s perception:
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The government made an error in not giving the correct number
of deaths. I think they felt threatened that people would know that
because of their negligence so many people died . . . one of the things
that you could tell from the media, when we finally had access, was
the criticism was strong.

According to stakeholder respondents, this affected perceptions of transparency and credibility. According to two participants:
In giving that [death] report they weren’t transparent, they weren’t
sincere with the public. Many of us understand that there’s no reason to hide it. They probably wanted to clean their image . . . I can’t
give a reason as to why they did it because I don’t understand, but
they weren’t transparent.—Health Center Personnel
That is what made the public so uncomfortable—they are not telling the truth, lying. I saw this and was saying, but my God, what’s
happening? What do they want to hide?—Former Department of
Health Personnel

The lack of clarity about the death certification process also
persisted in media coverage, signaling a major impediment to an
accurate count. Doctors and funeral home directors responding to
media indicated that they did not have clear guidelines for death
certification in disasters. Funeral directors noted that they had
been authorized to proceed with cremations and burials if a death
had been certified as unrelated to the hurricane. From September
20 to October 18, there was a seemingly higher than usual authorization of cremations. According to DPS personnel, these cremations were misunderstood to represent hurricane-related deaths:
. . . the body would stay in the hospital if they died there. If they
died at home and there was no electricity, they had to bury them. In
order to bury someone, you had to request a permit and the Bureau
of Forensic Sciences has to provide it. So, people opted to cremate
because there wasn’t time. That’s why cremations during that time
period increased. Also, it was cheaper. It had to be done . . . the
increase in cremations created the perception that all people who
were cremated died from the hurricane, but one thing has nothing
to do with the other.
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Explanation of shifting trends in cremations were not provided
to the public, opening space for misinterpretations, lingering suspicions, and questions about death reporting transparency. This
potentially influenced public perceptions regarding the credibility
of official death counts.
Unofficial Mortality Reports in the Information Environment
Numerous attempts were undertaken to employ alternative processes for identifying hurricane-related deaths. These investigative
reports, scientific studies, and media interviews with mayors, health
care professionals, and first responders, together with reporting of
available figures from the Demographic Registry, created a confusing post-disaster information environment. Uncertainty regarding
the official death count was echoed by stakeholder respondents,
who perceived that the count should have been higher given
their experiences. As one Municipal Police Commissioner and
Emergency Management Director noted:
My town is small. Here we all know each other. Here there were
weeks when I was saying, “My God, what is happening . . . every
day someone dies!” I am sure mortality increased . . . I assure you
that the information being provided wasn’t correct because I know
my town. I can tell you that . . . it was after the hurricane that it
increased. It elevated to a very alarming figure.

The perception of an undercount led these stakeholders to conclude that government leadership was disconnected from the realities that communities throughout Puerto Rico were experiencing.
For example, a Municipal Emergency Medical Director stated:
I believe that the impression they gave wasn’t correct because I’ve
always said that the number given was way below the reality . . . the
reality that I lived. My colleagues working with me and police that
were in the street lived it. This reality wasn’t lived by people who
were tucked away in the Command Center there in San Juan. . . .
they didn’t live the community’s reality . . . you had to suffer that
need . . .

Similarly, a Municipal Mayor noted, “I know, I have the numbers for my town, I don’t know about the country, but I know that
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here, deaths almost doubled. I bury them. I open the gates of the
cemetery.” Some community leaders compared official mortality
reports to media reports and calls on the radio about missing persons, which they perceived as credible firsthand sources of information. For example, in one community leader’s perception:
That they hid information because you see the news and how people
called the radio program saying that so-and-so is missing. Those
people that went missing maybe died and were never found. It is
understood that they died and that information the government
doesn’t offer as real.

Crisis and Emergency Risk Communication Capacity
In addition to the Government’s lack of CERC plans, there had
been insufficient pre-hurricane CERC training of communication personnel and official spokespersons, further limiting the
likelihood that CERC best practices would be utilized. This lack
of CERC training was apparent in spokesperson performance
and study respondent indication of a lack of formal training for
communication in disasters. As one government communications
employee noted:
When they told me to report to the Center for Operations in Emergencies . . . I had no idea what we were going to face. I had to face
a phenomenon of great proportions, but didn’t know what I was
going to do there. I’m talking about even at the most basic, personal
level of what to bring.

Following Hurricane Maria, there were few official spokespersons providing information to the public. The Governor initially conducted daily press conferences as the main spokesperson,
although he was sometimes accompanied by others. He appeared
to be prepared with relevant talking points, which aligned with
press releases. He seemed to listen carefully to questions and
responded without using overly technical language. To some
extent, he managed uncertainty by saying what was known, identifying what was still being reviewed, and indicating willingness to
provide information when available. However, when asked about
deaths, he often deferred to the Secretary of Public Safety instead
of a subject matter expert.
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The Secretary of Public Safety was also a prominent spokesperson. In his interactions with the media, he delivered concise
information, conveyed authority, acknowledged uncertainty in the
mortality count, and also indicated a willingness to provide more
information when available. However, he provided very limited
responses to media questions, and in some cases, contradictory
information. When asked about mortality, his responses tended to
be relatively limited, such as “We are still reviewing” or “as soon
as we get more data,” with no specifics provided about what was
still being reviewed, who was reviewing it, what type of data they
were waiting for, or why there were delays. Further, while maintaining on numerous occasions that the government would not
be influenced by anecdotes or assumptions, he stated in a press
appearance on November 8 that there could be an increase of 30%
in the average daily deaths. No details were provided to validate
this statistic, which conflicted with previous statements, including
one on October 1, when he speculated that deaths could increase
“exponentially.” The ineffective use of statistics and suppositions
may have influenced perceived credibility.
Both the Governor and the Secretary of Public Safety failed
to defer to subject matter experts early in the post-disaster period
to answer questions about mortality surveillance and death certification. It was not until November 8 that the Secretary of Public Safety called upon representatives from the Bureau of Forensic
Sciences and the Demographic Registry to discuss these processes
and respond to public inquiry. This coordination with subject
matter experts occurred too late. By that time, there were already
inconsistencies and rumors circulating in the information environment, as well as growing stakeholder frustration.
The credibility of official messages was also called into question with reports of contradictory or unconfirmed statements by
other public officials. One example was the Mayor of San Juan’s
response to the Secretary of Homeland Security, stating that the
death count could be 10 times higher than official data. The Secretary of Public Safety characterized this statement as “irresponsible,”
but did not offer corrections. In a media interview on September
28, the Puerto Rican Secretary of Health acknowledged that some
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hospital morgues were full. According to one funeral home director respondent, this contributed to misconceptions since deaths
occur daily regardless of disasters:
We are more or less the same right now [in April, 2018]—there
has not been an increase [in deaths]. People have the perception
that many more people died . . . because in a hospital there are 10
deaths a day, and funeral homes claim those bodies immediately . . .
but if funeral homes cannot go . . . tomorrow they have 20 and the
next day they have 30 . . . there is a perception that there are more
deceased than there are.

However, the Secretary of Health gave no explanation to contextualize morgue capacity. This information vacuum opened an
opportunity for misconceptions about hurricane-related deaths.
The Secretary of Health also provided mortality data that had
not yet been formally incorporated into the official death count.
For example, in the interview on September 28, he indicated that
there were seven additional deaths at hospitals, but the cause of
death was pending; yet the official death toll was 16. The release
of such unconfirmed, contradictory information may have influenced public perceptions of credibility and transparency.

Limitations
Several limitations should be considered when interpreting study
findings. Data was collected 7 months post-hurricane, introducing potential recall bias in respondent accounts. Additionally,
we undertook a rapid assessment with a condensed study timeline, limiting the digital media that could be reviewed and the
interview sample size. We did, however, focus our digital media
review on pivotal points in the availability of information, and
interviewed a number of key actors within the Government who
were involved in mortality data management or communication.
Furthermore, we recruited interview respondents with diversity
in a number of criteria that were likely to affect a community’s
experiences with the hurricane. Regardless of the sample size, we
reached saturation.
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Discussion
The days and weeks following Hurricane Maria were characterized
by widespread criticism of the Government of Puerto Rico’s handling of mortality reporting. In addition to the hurricane’s aftermath, there was also a crisis of death toll uncertainty. Not only did
this issue dominate discourse, detracting from other important
issues post-hurricane, it also raised key questions about planning
for similar complex disasters. The experiences of Hurricane Maria
highlighted areas of prospective research and practice that should
be prioritized by scientific and disaster communities, and signaled
areas related to disaster impact communication that should be
expanded upon in CERC guidelines—mortality communication
and communicating in catastrophic disaster contexts.
CERC Guidelines and Information Vacuums
One goal of communication in disasters is to provide accurate,
timely information to the public. According to CERC and WHO
guidelines (CDC, 2014; WHO, 2005), government administrations and disaster response organizations can build public confidence by having coordinated, transparent information sharing,
and trained spokespersons and subject matter experts to provide
consistent information and explanations. The Government faced
difficulties communicating about mortality, stemming from a lack
of CERC plans and the timing of recent government restructuring
that complicated coordination. These challenges were exacerbated
by not anticipating widespread infrastructure failures and a lack of
communicator CERC training.
Another goal of communication in disasters is to minimize
misinformation, which includes monitoring the information environment and counteracting rumors (Liu et al., 2014; Savoia et al.,
2017; Seeger, 2006). Following Hurricane Maria, the politicization
of the death count resulted in part from information gaps coupled
with insufficient monitoring and rumor control. Major interruptions to mortality surveillance resulted in delayed reporting and
a substantial information vacuum. Official and unofficial mortality reports proliferated in the media to fill this void, contributing to stakeholder perceptions that questioned credibility and
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transparency of the Government of Puerto Rico. In the context
of waning public trust, overall disaster response capabilities can
become greatly diminished.
Additionally, Government of Puerto Rico personnel did not
recount efforts to engage with stakeholders on social media or systematically monitor this digital information environment as part
of an overarching communication strategy. Official press conferences were streamed on the Governor’s Facebook Live account, but
there were no coordinated efforts taken to monitor and respond to
misinformation or rumors. Given the potential of social media for
disseminating verified information and minimizing the spread of
rumors, this was a missed opportunity. Practitioners engaged in
disaster preparedness planning should integrate social media use
into daily operations, dedicating personnel to facilitating stakeholder relationships, and monitoring and responding to public
reactions during crisis.
Situations also arose following the hurricane that were inadequately explained by spokespersons. These information gaps created opportunities for the public to question the Government’s
motives and speculate as to why the information was unavailable, when it was not necessarily a question of motive. Even in
the absence of timely mortality data, the processes of mortality
surveillance and death certification could have been described
and barriers to these processes detailed. These occurrences following Hurricane Maria raise the question about how governments
and disaster response organizations can adequately prepare to
communicate in catastrophic disasters, where the likelihood of
information vacuums is high, mortality surveillance is at risk for
disruption, and high levels of public interest and media coverage
can be anticipated. An important consideration is how information vacuums should be handled; however, while CERC guidelines
address the correction of misinformation and misperceptions in
the media, they do not elaborate on how information vacuums
should be handled by disaster communicators. Furthermore,
CERC guidelines delineating communication plan design and
implementation do not address catastrophic disaster situations,
when the communication landscape drastically changes and contingencies are required to maintain communication functions.
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Drawing from lessons learned following Hurricane Maria, current
CERC guidelines should be expanded to address these important
areas. With guidelines for communicating following catastrophic
disasters, planning can be undertaken to anticipate factors such
as elevated mortality yet disrupted mortality surveillance systems,
information vacuums accompanied by intense media interest,
and toppled communication infrastructure necessitating contingencies. With catastrophic CERC guidelines, communicators
following Hurricane Maria would have been better positioned to
prepare for substantial information vacuums and address them
more effectively through messaging and responding to the rapidly
evolving information environment; have communication plans
and contingencies in place to enable information sharing and
message coordination, including with local stakeholders throughout Puerto Rico; and anticipate mortality as a key point of public
interest and vital piece of information for disaster responders and
policymakers.
Communicating Post-Disaster Mortality
Risks to credibility, trust, and transparency can be mitigated in
part by having spokespersons who are highly trained in the subject
matter, and who place as much importance on the message itself
as the manner in which the message is communicated. CERC and
WHO recommendations detail considerations of spokesperson
selection, characteristics, and training. CERC and WHO guidelines also highlight the importance of delivering early messaging
from information sources that build credibility through illustrative descriptions for complex topics, background information,
supporting facts, third-party validations, and explanations of situations that may be questioned by the public. While Government
of Puerto Rico spokespersons were experienced in public speaking, the lack of CERC media training was notable. This was evidenced by spokesperson performance during press conferences
and media interviews, as well as accounts from study participants
who indicated that they had not been trained in disaster communication. Spokesperson missteps, including vague responses when
asked about disaster mortality, the use of inconsistent statistics,
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speculation about anticipated mortality counts, late involvement
of subject matter experts in press conferences, lack of supportive
materials to explain death certification, communication of deaths
to the media that had not yet been confirmed as hurricane-related, and inconsistent messaging between official spokespersons,
created a post-disaster information environment saturated with
criticism and diminished credibility of the Government of Puerto
Rico’s efforts.
Future disaster preparedness efforts should emphasize spokesperson and communication personnel training related to mortality
surveillance processes and communicating with the public about
mortality, especially following catastrophic events. This raises the
questions: What is the best way to communicate with the public
about disaster mortality, and what do we know about how public
audiences understand and interpret mortality estimates? The current CERC and WHO guidelines do not include a nuanced discussion of communicating disaster mortality to the public. Future
research should explore these areas in order to inform best practices.

Conclusion
The response and recovery period following Hurricane Maria
was punctuated by significant controversy surrounding mortality
reporting. Puerto Rican Government officials provided information they had available to them at the time and made attempts to be
open and transparent. Given the level of destruction experienced
in Puerto Rico, it is likely that delays in mortality surveillance and
temporary information gaps were inevitable. However, given these
circumstances, not applying CERC best practices and inadequate
CERC training led to unexplained information gaps and inconsistencies that contributed to rumors and controversy. Confusion
was intensified by numerous unofficial death counts in the information environment. Ultimately, the Government of Puerto Rico
lost the ability to effectively manage messaging, thus decreasing
their source credibility, perceived transparency, and public trust.
While an essential role of government in disasters is to protect the
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public from risk, the mortality count controversy drained political
capital and detracted from efforts to meet population health and
safety needs.
These experiences highlight the importance of CERC planning
and training, which should be expanded to include guidelines
for disasters of catastrophic scale where key resources and infrastructure are impacted, communication channels are similarly
degraded, and information vacuums are likely to occur. Future
research should examine the role of a robust CERC response in
disaster communications, as well as examine application of the
CERC model across diverse disasters and contexts, including
those with considerable resource constraints (Avery, 2019). These
occurrences also emphasize the need for more impact communication research, or communicating to the public about a disaster’s
impact, including mortality. Little is known about how audiences
process disaster mortality information. Consensus in this area
will inform development of anticipatory educational materials,
spokesperson training and key messages, guidelines for intersectoral and stakeholder collaboration, and recommendations for
navigating the post-disaster information environment.
Archived links from Table 1
CDC CERC manual guidelines. Retrieved from web archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190614141121/https://emergency.
cdc.gov/cerc/manual/index.asp

WHO Effective Media Communication During Public Health Emergencies
handbook. Retrieved from web archive:
https://web.archive.org/web/20190418231742/https://www.who.
int/csr/resources/publications/WHO_CDS_2005_31/en/
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ABSTRACT
In order to properly evaluate crises that occur in sports, scholars have previously called
for a sports-specific crisis communication typology (Wilson et al., 2010). Two studies
were conducted to develop the resulting typology. Study 1 utilized a questionnaire
to obtain a comprehensive list of sports-related crises that were later grouped into
12 crisis types and three unique clusters through the use of qualitative content analysis. Study 2 utilized a questionnaire completed by 282 college students to determine
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sports as a context by evaluating the level of organizational blame that exists when a
crisis occurs.
KEYWORDS: crisis communication, situational crisis communication theory, crisis
typology, sports communication

In 1919, eight Chicago Black Sox baseball players were accused
of accepting bribes from gamblers and intentionally losing the
World Series. The scandal rocked the sporting world and landed
on the front page of all major newspapers, marking the first time
the mainstream media prioritized the coverage of a sports-related
scandal. Today, sports scandals continue to receive vast amounts
of public scrutiny. Controversy surrounding issues of drug use,
domestic violence, sexual assault, racism, sexism, gambling, bribery, concussions, and more quite literally play out on the sports
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field while concurrently dominating media coverage. Because of
the large emphasis culture places on sports (Raney, 2006), such
scandals impact a vast audience as they dominate sports media
headlines and online trending topic lists.
Sports scandals permeate popular culture, as perhaps no other
form of entertainment connects as closely to a person’s self-esteem
as their sports team affiliation (Wann, 2006). When a crisis strikes
a sports organization or player, it often negatively affects their key
stakeholders, sports fans (N. A. Brown & Billings, 2013). Specifically, crises that impact sports organizations and athletes have the
ability to cause harm by tarnishing a team or athlete’s reputation or
impairing their in-game performance. Additionally, the negative
fallout from recent sports-related crises shows their impact has
progressed beyond the field, including the potential to damage a
university’s entire organizational brand (e.g., Michigan State/Larry
Nassar scandal; Penn State scandal; Baylor University scandal).
In order to address the impact of sports-related crises, this
study seeks to test a primary component of Coombs’s (1999b) situational crisis communication theory (SCCT) by examining the
level of crisis responsibility attributed to a sports organization in
crisis. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that organizations can
improve the overall effectiveness of their crisis responses by evaluating the level of responsibility that stakeholders attribute to them
during crises. By exploring the different types of crises that sports
organizations encounter, this study seeks to answer the call of Wilson et al. (2010) to establish a typology of crises that impact sports
organizations, which the authors noted would be valuable for
sports crisis scholars by allowing them to more effectively define
and examine sports-related crises.
Thus, this manuscript features two studies to measure the
level of crisis responsibility attributed to each type of sportsrelated crisis. Following the methodology of Mitroff, Pauchant,
and Shrivastava (1988), the first study surveyed sports communication researchers to form a comprehensive list of sports-related
crises, which was then clustered through the use of conventional
qualitative content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). In the second study, researchers replicated the methodology utilized by
Coombs and Holladay (2002) and administered a quantitative
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survey of 282 college students to evaluate the level of crisis responsibility attributed to an organization during each type of crisis. The
survey also helped the researchers determine how each type of crisis impacts an organization’s reputation and the amount of control
stakeholders perceive an organization had over the situation.

Literature Review
Crisis Communication Typologies
Coombs (2012) defines a crisis as the “perception of an unpredictable event that threatens important expectancies of stakeholders
related to health, safety, environment, and economic issues, and
can seriously impact an organization’s performance and generates
negative outcomes” (p. 3). Communication scholars have long
evaluated the reputational threat that results from organizational
crises (Coombs, 2012; Coombs & Holladay, 1996). Coombs and
Holladay (2002) noted that an organization’s reputation is a valuable asset among stakeholders; and, as such, reputational threats
should be avoided. When crises do befall an organization, stakeholders typically re-evaluate the favorability of an organization’s
reputation, prompting organizations to strategically engage in reputation repair (Coombs & Holladay, 2005).
Scholarship has long investigated how to best respond to a
plethora of crises. Benson (1988) suggested a need for a theoretical approach to address the following tenets: (1) synthesize existing crisis communication literature into a typology of crisis types
that might alarm an organization; (2) synthesize reputation repair
strategies that can be utilized during a crisis; and (3) establish a
theoretical linkage between the type of crisis an organization faces
and the corresponding repair strategy that should be selected. This
call was later addressed by Coombs’s (1999b) SCCT.
SCCT champions the importance of beginning a crisis response
by first analyzing the type of crisis that threatens an organization
in order to guide the effective selection of a reputation repair strategy (Coombs, 1999b). Coombs (2012) noted that to evaluate the
reputational threat a certain crisis poses, three factors must be
addressed: crisis type, crisis history, and prior reputation. In order
to address the first factor, Coombs and Holladay (2002) developed
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a list of crisis types and the levels of crisis responsibility associated
with each. Coombs and Holladay (2002) defined a crisis type as
“the frame that publics use to interpret an event” (p. 167). Their
list featured 10 crisis types that were placed into one of three different categories: victim crises (resulting in minimal crisis responsibility), accident crises (resulting in low crisis responsibility), and
preventable crises (resulting in strong crisis responsibility). These
crisis clusters are “premised on the logic of crisis portfolios: similar crises can be managed in similar fashions” (Coombs & Holladay, 2002, p. 180). While Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) typology
has been widely used in crisis scholarship, its methodology has
not yet been replicated by other crisis scholars to create additional
crisis typologies.
This concept is meant to simplify the process of selecting optimal response strategies that are associated with similar crises.
By first acknowledging the type of crisis an organization faces,
crisis managers can determine the amount of blame and crisis
responsibility stakeholders attribute to the organization, itself
(Coombs & Holladay, 2002). SCCT states that the more crisis
responsibility the public attributes to an organization, the more
accommodating an organization will need to be toward the victims when selecting reputation repair strategies (Coombs, 2012).
Essentially, a proper evaluation of crisis type should improve the
overall effectiveness of a crisis response (Coombs & Holladay,
2002). After analyzing the crisis type, a crisis manager should
adjust his/her initial assessment of attribution, which depends
upon other significant factors such as the organization’s crisis history and its prior relationship with stakeholders. Only then should
a crisis manager select a proper reputation repair strategy.
Crisis Communication and Sports
The combination of media prominence of sports issues and an
“increased activism of sports fans” led to a surge of sports crisis
communication research (K. A. Brown et al., 2012, p. 155). The
expansion of sports-centric programming channels such as ESPN
and Fox Sports created print, broadcast, online, and mobile outlets dedicated to covering every aspect of sports, including sports
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scandals. While the uncertainty of sports outcomes establishes a
certain amount of inherent drama, a crisis striking the field of play
can only heighten that effect. Such growth in exposure and interest
can increase sports organizations’ profitability. Thus, researchers
wanted to determine the extent to which a sports team or athlete’s
reputation affected them financially by exploring the intersection
of sports and crisis management (Brazeal, 2008). The resulting
sports crisis communication research primarily examined sports
crises through the use of image repair theory (IRT) and SCCT
(Benoit & Hanczor, 1994; Brazeal, 2008; N. A. Brown & Billings,
2013; K. A. Brown et al., 2012).
Rationale for Sports-Specific Crisis Typology
While previous sports crises have been evaluated using SCCT’s
reputation repair strategies (Brown & Billings, 2013; Richards et
al., 2017; Williams & Olaniran, 2002), Brown et al. (2015) noted
that SCCT’s typology does not fully encompass sports-related crises and, as a result, scholars have been unable to fully test SCCT’s
theoretical linkages in the sports context. As such, the Coombs
and Holladay (2002) typology has not been utilized by sports-related crisis research. Perhaps this is unsurprising given Björck’s
(2016) claim that “a single typology cannot capture the complexity and interdisciplinary nature of a crisis” (p. 1). Therefore, context-specific crisis typologies have been developed in areas such as
tourism (Laws & Prideaux, 2008), restaurant management (Tse &
Sin, 2006), governmental relations (Rosenthal & Kouzmin, 1997),
and, of course, corporate contexts (Coombs, 1999a).
Björck (2016) noted that crisis scholarship should formulate
typologies that reflect important “cultural and contextual dimensions” (p. 1), such as the unique nature of sports and its vital cultural significance (Raney, 2006). In order to address this need for
typologies in the sports context, Wilson et al. (2010) established an
initial framework for classifying sports-related crises (i.e., “unintentional/intentional” and “internal/external”), and noted that
future scholars should incorporate a quantitative component to
this area of research. Yet, scholarly examinations of sports-specific crises must account for the fact that crises can result from
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individual or organizational actions. As noted by Sato et al. (2015),
Wilson et al.’s initial framework would need to be expanded upon
to incorporate “the unique characteristics of athlete reputational
challenges that distinguish them from other celebrity scandals”
(p. 436), and how athlete actions that violate the “nature of sport”
can also impact the larger organization’s reputation. Additionally,
Hughes and Shank (2005) sought to define characteristics of a
sports scandal in order to aid sports scholars’ understanding of
the impact of such issues. However, they did not formulate a crisis typology with their results. Yet, the authors did call for future
research that would help scholars quantitatively understand both
the short- and long-term impacts of sports scandals on stakeholders’ affiliations with sports organizations.
Previous scholarship displays a clear need for a crisis communication typology in the context of sports that can aid scholars
who explore sports-related crises quantitatively, and are guided by
theories such as SCCT (Wilson et al., 2010). While both corporations and sports teams are often thought of as organizations driven
by profits, the largest threats to each of their reputations are too
unique to be placed under one conceptual umbrella. Thus, in order
to further extend the work of Wilson et al., the following research
question is proffered:
RQ1: What types of crises do sports organizations and athletes
commonly face?

In order to establish a sports crisis communication typology, a
list of crisis types provides crisis managers with some guidance in
their selection of response strategies. Wilson et al. (2010) advised
future scholars to draw upon tenets of SCCT, namely attribution
theory, when further developing sports-related crisis communication research. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that crisis
managers must ascertain the level of crisis responsibility the public attributes to the offending organization in order to choose a
response strategy with the proper level of accommodation toward
the victims. SCCT (Coombs, 2012) includes a list of 10 crisis types
divided into three clusters ranging from a minimal amount of crisis responsibility to a strong amount of crisis responsibility: victim
crises, accident crises, and preventable crises (Coombs, 2012). In
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order to establish a sports crisis communication typology, a list of
sports crises must be categorized according to the level of crisis
responsibility perceived by the public. Thus, the following research
question is offered:
RQ2: Based on amount of responsibility attributed, what clusters
will emerge from the list of crises?

One of the central tenets of SCCT posits that “perception of
crisis responsibility is directly correlated [with] reputational damage,” meaning that as crisis responsibility increases, the possibility
of damage to an organization’s reputation also increases (Coombs
& Holladay, 2002, p. 173). The correlation between crisis responsibility and organizational reputation is the key linkage in SCCT;
therefore, this new typology must also demonstrate this linkage.
Thus, the researchers posit the following hypothesis:
H1: A direct correlation will exist between crisis responsibility and
organizational reputation for each of the clusters.

Study 1 Methods
Initial Qualitative Questionnaire
Following the methodology of Mitroff et al. (1988), researchers contacted an expert panel of sports communication scholars
through member listservs of two scholarly organizations devoted
to sports communication research: the Association for Education
in Journalism and Mass Communication (AEJMC) Sports
Communication Interest Group and the International Association
of Communication and Sport (IACS). The researchers gathered
responses and created a database of potential crises that plague
athletes or teams, as this initial list would be synthesized into a
typology of crises that ideally would be comprehensive with few
potential outliers. The researchers provided members of each listserv with a link to an online survey that contained a single openended question requesting scholars to brainstorm a list of crises
that have affected, or could have affected, sports teams and/or
athletes in recent years. Scholars employed their own definition
of what constituted a crisis when responding to the questionnaire
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and were encouraged to list crises that affected all sports. The initial
survey yielded responses from 23 researchers, and produced a list
of 263 sports crises, which encompassed crises that have affected
virtually every imaginable sport from badminton to baseball.
Qualitative Content Analysis and Formation of Crisis Types
The authors then utilized conventional qualitative content analysis as described by Hsieh and Shannon (2005), where the data
gathered from the open-ended survey questions were then used to
generate a list of crisis types. Qualitative content analysis was utilized since it is ideal for concept development (Hsieh & Shannon,
2005; Lindkvist, 1981). Conventional qualitative content analysis
provides a method for researchers to “combine or organize this
larger number of subcategories into a smaller number of categories” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1279).
To follow the procedures as described by Hsieh and Shannon
(2005), the primary author examined the qualitative survey data
guided by Coombs’s (2012) definition of a crisis, and made notes
on initial impressions of the crises so that labels for codes emerged.
In order to follow the method used in the development of previous crisis management typologies (Mitroff et al., 1988; Wilson
et al., 2010), the author began grouping each response based on
traditional crisis communication variables (internal/external crisis, individual/organizational, etc.), to develop groupings based on
“how different codes are related and linked” (Hsieh & Shannon,
2005). Each included crisis had to fit Coombs’s (2012) definition of
a crisis, and accordingly present one of the following three threats:
public safety, financial loss, or reputation loss.
Twelve crisis types resulted from this process. Hsieh and Shannon (2005) noted that, ideally, the numbers of clusters that result
from conventional qualitative content analysis will be between 10
and 15. The project’s co-author examined the development of each
crisis type to ensure there was agreement regarding the resulting
list, as was recommended by Elo et al. (2014). In order to ensure
face validity, the authors followed the recommendation by Elo
et al. and presented the list during a conference panel comprised
of sports scholars prior to publication in order to garner feedback.
Scholars who attended the presentation agreed that a sport-specific
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typology would greatly aid crisis communication scholars who
conduct research in the sports context and did not recommend
any changes to the presented typology. They did, however, recommend using it in additional studies to continue to validate it.

Study 1 Results
The first research question focused on synthesizing the crises provided during the initial survey into a crisis typology. Based on the
list of crises, a typology of 12 crises was formed, divided tentatively into two categories for the sake of discussion: internal crises
and external crises. Appendix A provides specific examples from
the questionnaire results for each crisis type.
Internal crises directly affect the field of play. There are six of
these crisis types. Internal criminal transgressions include actions
that involve a sports figure that leads directly to an arrest, legal
action, and/or conviction that happened during a competition.
Logistical and operational issues involve issues that affect the viewing of a sports event that were not caused by a natural disaster.
Amateurism transgressions consist of issues that affect the amateur
status of a sports figure (notably college or Olympic-style competitors). Competition transgressions contain actions involving a sports
figure or team that directly compromises the fair nature of competition. Player/coach management issues encompass issues surrounding a sports figure that would directly affect the team’s active
roster or coaching staff, such as illegal or unethical firings, especially those that result in legal action. Misleading internal information involves statements or other information provided by a sports
figure related to internal operations that causes some controversy
or compromises his/her position with the team.
External crises indirectly affect the field of play. There are also
six of these crisis types. External criminal transgressions involve
actions involving a sports figure that leads directly to an arrest,
legal action, and/or conviction that did not happen during the
course of competition. Personal lifestyle transgressions result from
actions involving a sports figure that affect his/her personal life, but
do not lead to an arrest and/or conviction (more morally wrong
than criminally wrong). Controversial statements/actions consist of
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statements or actions made by a sports figure that are inappropriate or that caused some controversy, but did not lead directly to an
arrest and/or conviction, and did not address some aspect of the
team. “Act of God” events are actions that affect a sports figure or
a team that were outside of his/her/its control. League/conference
management issues result from issues surrounding a team affiliation or league operations that do not directly affect the course of
competition.

Study 2 Method
In order to establish a sports crisis communication typology,
the list of sports crises generated in study 1 must be categorized
according to the level of crisis responsibility perceived by sports
audiences.
Quantitative Survey and Measurement of Crisis
Responsibility
After the qualitative survey and qualitative content analysis,
researchers conducted a full administration of the crisis typology to assign levels of crisis responsibility. The researchers used a
method similar to Coombs and Holladay’s (2002) method of clustering organizational crises according to its level of responsibility,
which ranged from minimal crisis responsibility to strong crisis
responsibility. In order to measure the level of crisis responsibility associated with each of the crisis types synthesized from the
pilot study, the researchers distributed an online survey hosted by
Qualtrics to participants. The authors selected articles from ESPN.
com reporting on a crisis that could be classified into one of each
of the 12 resulting categories. The 12 articles used in the study
included an average of 550 words, which lead to approximately
1.5 double-spaced pages. Appendix A provides definitions and
examples of each crisis type. Participants were given as much
time as needed to read the articles and answer the questions that
followed. To prevent survey fatigue, participants were randomly
assigned by the Qualtrics software to evaluate only two of the crisis types. Participants were asked to read each article and answer
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items to help evaluate the level of crisis responsibility associated
with each crisis.
Questionnaire
In order to measure the amount of crisis responsibility attributed
to each of the 12 resulting crisis types, the researchers designed a
22-item questionnaire to measure organizational reputation, personal control, and crisis responsibility. A sample consisting of 282
college students from a large Southeastern university was utilized
for this study. The sample was 25% male (n = 72) with ages ranging
from 18 to 29 (M = 20.4, SD = 1.3). While Coombs and Holladay
(2002) noted that students are not generally the primary audience
for corporate crisis response, Enoch (2011) stated that people ages
18–24 classify themselves as avid sports fans. Therefore, college
students constitute a large audience for crises involving sports
organizations and/or athletes and are a valuable population to
examine.
Organizational reputation. The researchers measured organizational reputation using five 7-point Likert scales adapted from
Coombs and Holladay’s (1996) Organizational Reputation Scale
(α = 0.806). This scale is an adaptation of McCroskey’s (1966)
scale used to measure credibility, and included items such as “The
organization is basically DISHONEST,” and “Under most circumstances, I would be likely to believe what the organization says.”
The items were combined to create a composite mean score. This
scale was also utilized in a study that sampled the same population
by K. A. Brown et al. (2015).
Personal control. Researchers measured personal control using
four 7-point Likert scales adapted from McAuley et al.’s (1992)
Causal Dimension Scale II (α = 0.745). These items measured the
degree to which the event is controllable by the organization, and
included items such as “The cause of the crisis is something that
was manageable by the organization,” and “The cause of the crisis
is something over which the organization had no power.”
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Crisis responsibility. Crisis responsibility was measured using
Griffin et al.’s (1992) three 7-point Likert scales for measuring
blame. Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted this scale is acceptable for measuring crisis responsibility of an organization. The
scale had a Cronbach’s alpha of 0.72 and included items such as
“Circumstances, not the organization are responsible for the crisis”
and “The blame for the crisis lies with the organization.” Based on
previous research, Coombs and Holladay (2002) treated personal
control and crisis responsibility as one common variable, and
combined the two scales into one variable of “crisis responsibility.”
Based on a principal components factor analysis with a Varimax
rotation, similar to Coombs and Holladay (2002), the items used in
this study loaded under one factor as well, accounting for 47.52%
of the variance with an eigenvalue of 3.327. The final scale had a
Cronbach’s alpha of 0.79. Thus, the two scales were combined to
form a crisis responsibility composite mean score.
Other questionnaire items. The instrument included two questions
to check comprehension. After participants read each news article, items asked “What is the name of the organization accused
in the preceding article?” and “What is the crisis presented in the
preceding article?” Participants that offered incorrect responses to
the two questions were excluded from the sample. The questionnaire yielded a total of 562 article responses, since each participant
viewed two news articles. Yet, incorrect responses to knowledge
questions eliminated 57 responses, bringing the total number of
responses to 505. Each participant also answered a four-item fan
identification scale adapted from Wann and Branscombe (1993)
Sports Spectator Identification Scale (SSIS). Finally, four items
measured demographics such as age, gender, ethnicity, and educational status. SPSS version 20.0 was used to analyze all collected
data.

Study 2 Results
The second research question focused on grouping the 12 crisis
types into clusters. Similar to the method used by Coombs and
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Holladay (2002), a hierarchical cluster analysis was used to create
homogeneous clusters of crisis types based on similar characteristics. Since crisis responsibility is central to this typology, just like
in SCCT, it was the variable used to create the crisis clusters. This
method creates clusters so that the members of the same cluster
have a stronger degree of association among themselves, but a
weaker degree of association between themselves and members of
a different cluster (Coombs & Holladay, 2002).
TABLE 1

Crisis Typology and Mean Scores for Three-Cluster Solution
Crisis
Responsibility

Organizational
Reputation

Environmental/
Individual Crisis

M = 3.10 (SD = 0.997) M = 4.96 (SD = 1.075)

“Act of God” Event

M = 2.56 (SD = 1.034)

M = 5.23 (SD = 0.931)

Controversial Statement/
Action

M = 3.12 (SD = 1.010)

M = 5.17 (SD = 1.119)

Personal Lifestyle
Transgression

M = 3.25 (SD = 1.096)

M = 5.02 (SD = 1.280)

External Criminal
Transgression

M = 3.16 (SD = 0.947)

M = 4.64 (SD = 0.996)

Internal Criminal
Transgression

M = 3.40 (SD = 0.714)

M = 4.80 (SD = 0.997)

Rules and Norms
Violations

M = 3.71 (SD = 0.899) M = 4.86 (SD = 1.036)

Fan Involvement Issue

M = 3.69 (SD = 0.914)

M = 4.90 (SD = 1.126)

Amateurism Transgression M = 3.70 (SD = 1.028)

M = 4.75 (SD = 0.920)

Competition
Transgression

M = 3.74 (SD = 0.768)

M = 4.85 (SD = 1.070)

Organizational
Mismanagement

M = 4.22 (SD = 0.873) M = 4.47 (SD = 0.931)

League/Conference
Management Issue

M = 4.02 (SD = 0.875)

M = 4.76 (SD = 0.922)

Logistical/Operational
Issue

M = 4.30 (SD = 0.908)

M = 4.43 (SD = 0.859)

Misleading Internal
Information

M = 4.35 (SD = 0.911)

M = 4.38 (SD = 1.006)
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Based on the agglomeration schedule using Ward’s method,
a more efficient method of measuring distance between clusters
due to its analysis of variance approach (Burns & Burns, 2009),
the optimal cluster grouping was a three-cluster solution. Much
less distinguishing existed between cases for subsequent clustering after the three-cluster solution. A one-way ANOVA found the
cluster solution was a good fit, based on the cluster’s crisis responsibility and organizational reputation scores. Table 1 provides the
mean scores for the three-cluster solution. Significant differences
existed among the three clusters for crisis responsibility (F (2, 502)
= 68.785; p < 0.001) and organizational reputation (F (2, 502) =
11.409; p < 0.001).
The first cluster that resulted from the study was the “environmental/individual crisis” cluster. This cluster included the following crisis types: act of God event, controversial statement/action,
personal lifestyle transgression, external criminal transgression,
and internal criminal transgression. The crises in this initial cluster result from the actions of a specific individual or from an
environmental event that are perceived to be outside of the organization’s realm of control. Thus, such crises result in the lowest
level of organizational crisis responsibility.
“Rules and norms violations” was the second cluster that
emerged from the study. This cluster included the following crisis types: fan involvement issues, amateurism transgressions, and
competition transgressions. The crises in this cluster all involve
a rule being broken by the organization and a moderate level of
organizational crisis responsibility is attributed to these crises.
“Organizational mismanagement” was the final cluster that
emerged from the study. This cluster included the following crisis
types: league/conference management issue, logistical/operational
issue, player/coach management issue, and misleading internal
information. These crises all involve an issue that should be located
within the organization’s realm of control; yet, the organization’s
mismanagement of that issue led to the crisis. Therefore, the organization possesses a high level of crisis responsibility attributed to
crises in this cluster.
Hypothesis 1 examined the relationship between crisis responsibility and organizational reputation—the key linkage in SCCT.
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The hypothesis posited that there would be a significant correlation for each of the three clusters. Based on the analysis, there was
a negative, significant correlation for each cluster, meaning that
the theoretical association between responsibility and reputation
was present (Cluster 1: r (207) = –0.584; p < 0.001; Cluster 2: r
(128) = –0.328; p < 0.001; Cluster 3: r (170) = –0.286; p < 0.001).
Thus, hypothesis 1 was supported.

Discussion
Theoretical Contribution
This study establishes an important intersection of sports scholarship and crisis communication that aids scholars who wish to
empirically examine crises in the sports context. First, this research
provided an important theoretical contribution for crisis communication scholarship, as it was the first to replicate the Coombs
and Holladay (2002) study. The findings confirmed the relationship between crisis responsibility and organizational reputation
and supplied evidence to the use of hierarchical cluster analysis
to create and analyze crisis typologies. While there could be concerns that contextually-specific crisis typologies such as the one
that resulted from this study could decrease the comparability of
results from differing contexts, this study’s results show that it is
possible to both conceptualize the unique crises that impact organizations in a context-specific typology and have the principle theoretical association between responsibility and reputation persist.
Thus, the theoretical linkage of SCCT that is rooted in attribution
theory should still persist and protect primary theoretical applications across contexts. This notion should be further examined by
future research.
Additionally, as the number of sports-related scandals grow
in both number and notoriety, the need to examine them with a
proper theoretical lens also grows. This study initiates an important first step toward the development of a sports-related crisis
communication typology by providing a synthesized list of potential crises that impact sports organizations. Coombs (2012) noted
that three factors must be considered before engaging in crisis
response: crisis type, crisis history, and prior reputation. While
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this study classifies crises into clusters based on similarly attributed
levels of organizational responsibility, it is important to note that
levels of resulting organizational blame can be heightened by an
organization’s crisis history and prior reputation. For instance,
Coombs and Holladay (2002) noted that these factors can create
a Velcro effect, where a negative reputation can lead to increased
reputational damage. Conversely, a positive reputation can help an
organization outlast a crisis, which is called the halo effect.
Crisis Typology Clusters
The 12 crisis types that resulted from this study were classified
into three distinct clusters: environmental/individual crisis, rules
violation, and organizational mismanagement. First, the “environmental/individual crisis” cluster results from the actions of
an individual associated with the organization or from an environmental event. This cluster’s low level of crisis responsibility
suggests that the audience does not hold the organization largely
responsible for the actions of each individual. The low level of
organizational blame associated with this cluster suggests that the
organization’s reputation does not face a strong threat from these
crises. However, the reputational threat sometimes increases when
assessing crisis history and prior reputation (Coombs, 2012).
For example, despite the University of Florida’s on-field successes during Head Coach Urban Meyer’s tenure, a string of over
30 player arrests eventually forced some media members to question the direction and discipline record of the Florida football
program (Hyde, 2010). Thus, this example shows how the acts of
individual players harmed the organization’s reputation by boosting this crisis to the next level of organizational responsibility.
The “rules and norms violation” cluster involves rules that
sports organizations either violated or overlooked. This cluster
results in a moderate level of crisis responsibility being attributed
to the organization, as fans expect sports teams to protect the heralded integrity and fairness of the game (Pawlenka, 2005). The
“rules and norms violation” cluster possesses a strong dependence
upon the factors of crisis history and prior reputation when determining the resulting crisis responsibility level. Audiences might
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forgive a first-time offender when rules are violated, as organizations can claim ignorance. However, if an organization is a repeat
offender, the current crisis would present a much larger reputational threat (Coombs & Holladay, 2005). Repeat offenses are
likely to increase the perceived crisis responsibility from the moderate level typically associated with this cluster to the strong level
of crisis responsibility typically associated with the organizational
mismanagement cluster.
The final cluster, “organizational mismanagement,” resulted
in the highest amount of crisis responsibility being attributed to
the sports organization. All crises classified into this cluster arose
from the organization’s own mismanagement. The public is unforgiving of crises that are preventable through proper management
techniques. Organizations that face crises in this cluster also face
a strong reputational threat and must select crisis response strategies accordingly.
Crisis Communication and Fandom
It must be noted that the mean scores that resulted from this
study suggest that while participants did rank the organizational
mismanagement cluster more highly, the scores were still in the
“neutral” range. This finding points to the importance of team
identification in sports crisis communication research (Wann &
Branscombe, 1993). Given that this study utilized true crises that
affected a variety of teams and athletes, participants were likely not
highly identified with all the organizations/athletes involved in the
offending actions. Thus, the crises did not reach a level of personal
relevance to participants that would lead them to more highly
ranked levels of crisis responsibility. Therefore, this typology
should be used to further examine the variable of fandom in crisis
communication by examining fans’ evaluations of crises that feature the specific athlete or sporting organization with which they
identify. Additionally, fandom might explain why the results of this
study showed that the degree of correlation decreased as the level
of responsibility increased. Future research should assess whether
this relationship is also observed among highly-identified fans.
Also, this study analyzes the organizational crisis responsibility
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attributed to each of the 12 crisis types. Yet, sports crises are not
simply experienced on an organizational level, as some crises primarily result from and impact an individual’s actions. The relationship between the crisis typology clusters and the individual/
organizational nature of the crisis must be explored, especially in
a sports setting.

Limitations
This study is certainly not without its limitations. First, the
researchers utilized a convenience sample of college students for
the full administration of the survey. While this study still provides valuable findings, a convenience sample cannot yield generalizable results. As such, future research should examine this
typology by utilizing a more generalizable sample. Furthermore,
sports literature has also noted that men and women consume
and enjoy sports differently (Raney, 2006). Given that this study’s
sample skewed heavily female (n = 75%), future studies should
obtain samples that allow for the examination of whether men
and women evaluate crises in the resulting typology differently.
This is especially necessary given the findings of K. A. Brown
et al. (2015) that found that “race was a more predominant factor in the image repair process than gender” (p. 499). As such,
potential racial differences should also be examined. In addition,
in study 1, participants were encouraged to use their own definition of what constituted a crisis. While the authors conducted the
resulting qualitative content analysis guided by Coombs’s (2012)
definition, not providing participants with Coombs’s definition in
the questionnaire could present a potential limitation.

Conclusion
This study established a foundation for a sports-specific crisis
typology, simplifying the lens through which crises will be evaluated. In doing so, the number of potential crises that could impact
a sporting organization was reduced from an initial list of 263 to
12, greatly reducing the burden of the “pre-crisis” phase. This study
also divided the 12 crisis types into three clusters (environmental/
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individual crises; rules and norms violations; and organizational
mismanagement), reflecting the amount of organizational crisis
responsibility that would be associated with each event. This practice will aid both scholars and practitioners in evaluating prominent crises in sports.
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ABSTRACT
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—including drugs, devices,
and biologics—is often critical in emergency situations. Such communication, however, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for. One mechanism to
develop communication strategies is through the use of prospective scenarios, which
allow readers the opportunity to rehearse responses while also weighing the implications of their actions. This article describes the development of such a scenario: The
SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028. Steps in this process included deciding on a time frame,
identifying likely critical uncertainties, and then using this framework to construct a
storyline covering both the response and recovery phases of a fictional emergency
event. Lessons learned from the scenario development and how the scenario can be
used to improve communication are also discussed.
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biological, radiological, or nuclear (CBRN) incidents (Courtney
& Sadove, 2015). It is not uncommon for members of the public,
however, to misuse or hesitate to take recommended MCM (Liu
et al., 2017; Quinn et al., 2008; Steelfisher et al., 2011). New and
unfamiliar technology, an accelerated regulatory approval process,
or discordant expert views may heighten perceived risks of MCM,
leading to public aversion to the countermeasure and/or diminished public trust in MCM regulators or recommenders (Belongia
et al., 2005; Carlsen & Glenton, 2016; Henrich & Holmes, 2011).
In other cases, strong feelings of vulnerability in an emergency situation may prompt persons to demand unnecessary MCM, protest their lack of access to MCM with limited availability, and/or
use an excessive amount of prescribed MCM (Dart et al., 2015;
Durigon & Kosatsky, 2012; Whitcomb et al., 2015). In still other
situations, certain social groups may have limited access to MCM
because some institutions are still in the process of learning how
culture, race, language, and citizenship status produce barriers to
health information sharing (Lin et al., 2014; Uscher-Pines et al.,
2011). To mitigate all of these issues and ensure proper and timely
use of MCM, good communication is key.
From 2014 to 2016, the Center for Health Security undertook
a research project to catalog MCM communication “dilemmas”
(in the broad sense of a problem) in emergency situations and
provide practical and strategic recommendations on how better
to obtain desired population health outcomes through improved
communication. The principal product was a casebook featuring
recent health crises (e.g., 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola outbreak
and 2011 Fukushima nuclear plant accident) that helped to illustrate the principles and conditions for effective MCM communication (Schoch-Spana et al., 2016).
Much of the practice-oriented literature relies upon real crises to illustrate successful (or failed) approaches to risk and crisis
communication (e.g., Centers for Disease Control and Prevention [CDC], 2018; Ulmer et al., 2017). The project team similarly
used past health emergencies to advance understanding of how
communication enables appropriate public use of MCMs, because
case studies have compelling benefits for learning: People reason effectively through analogy and not just abstract principles,
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contextualization makes broader principles meaningful and memorable, and cases promote reflective thinking and reinforce users’
abilities to apply that knowledge in novel settings (Allchin, 2013;
Epling et al., 2003).
Leveraging the same didactic qualities as retrospective cases
(Varum & Melo, 2010), the project team subsequently developed
a fictionalized prospective scenario—The SPARS Pandemic 2025–
2028—to further prepare users for MCM-related risk and crisis
communication dilemmas on the horizon. A scenario is an “analytically coherent” and “imaginatively engaging” story about a possible future state (Bishop et al., 2007) that spurs users to envision
and exercise their role in shaping potential outcomes (Borjeson
et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008).
Outlined in this paper and available in full online (Schoch-Spana
et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to help authorities
better anticipate MCM emergency communication dilemmas,
understand the larger contexts, practice effective responses, and
develop acuity and agility for addressing unforeseen problems.
The SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028 features MCM communication
dilemmas both of the enduring and emerging kind—especially
those in relation to evolving information and communication
technologies (ICT).
Benefits of Scenarios and Simulations in Preparing for
Disasters and Epidemics
The forward-looking SPARS scenario is a tool meant to prompt
readers to imagine the dynamic and oftentimes conflicted circumstances in which MCM emergency communication takes place. By
engaging readers with a rigorous, simulated health emergency the
scenario provides opportunities for readers to mentally “rehearse”
responses while also weighing the implications of their actions
(Borjeson et al., 2006). Apart from testing out responses to foreseeable events, the scenario also provides readers opportunities
to consider potential measures in today’s environment that might
avert comparable problems or classes of problems in the future;
that is, consider how to create a preferred future (Bishop et al.,
2007; Borjeson et al., 2006; Mahmoud et al., 2009; Wilkinson &
Eidinow, 2008).
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Producing coherent and imaginative narratives about the
future to inform decision-making in the present is an approach to
planning and risk management that businesses, think tanks, governments, and non-governmental organizations have embraced
for a half century or more, and a wide range of aims, applications, and techniques have evolved (Bishop et al., 2007; Varum
& Melo, 2010; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). In the case of a lowprobability high-consequence event like a pandemic or CBRN
incident in which MCM may be deployed, scenario development
provides a way—absent an actual emergency—for stakeholders to
characterize specific impacts (based on the accepted science), create a shared vision of the threat, weigh alternatives futures with or
without risk-reducing interventions, and stimulate action (Earthquake Engineering Research Institute [EERI], 2019; Preuss & Godfrey, 2006). Earthquake and bioterrorism scenarios, for instance,
have played important roles in motivating creative thinking about
the need for novel policies and programs and in mobilizing new
constituencies around seismic risk reduction (National Research
Council [NRC], 2011) and public health emergency preparedness
(Hamilton & Smith, 2006; O’Toole et al., 2002), respectively.
Scenarios that depict an unfolding crisis are valuable tools that
can heighten awareness about complex hazards and also enable
practical training for the management of disasters and epidemics
through exercises (European Centre for Disease Prevention and
Control [ECDC], 2014; Federal Emergency Management Agency
[FEMA], 2019; World Health Organization [WHO], 2018).
Discussion-based exercises (often called tabletop exercises) help
participants, typically decision-makers, become more familiar
with emergency plans and procedures, individual and organizational roles and responsibilities, and special challenges posed by
a particular threat to public health and safety. By contrast, operation-based exercises (such as drills, functional exercises, and field
exercises) attempt to incorporate, to a lesser or greater degree, the
front-line personnel, equipment, and physical spaces expected to
be in play during an actual emergency (FEMA, 2019; Skryabina
et al., 2017). A majority of studies on the effectiveness of training in emergency risk communication, in particular, conclude
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that the impacts of tabletop exercises and simulation for training
include enhanced awareness, readiness, and knowledge (Miller
et al., 2017).
Social Media Challenges/Opportunities for Health and MCM
Communication
Like the previously mentioned earthquake and bioterrorism scenarios, the SPARS scenario is meant to prepare risk and crisis
communicators for future emergencies, and in particular the complex conditions that rapidly-evolving ICT, including social media,
are now generating around medicine/public health generally and
MCM specifically.
ICT use, including text, illustrations, photo, audio, videos, and
diagrams communicated through blog posts, instant messages,
video chats, and social network platforms, is now widespread and
often used for health-related activities. Among members of the
public, a 2010 survey by the Pew Research Center, for instance,
showed that 8 in 10 internet users look online for health information, making it the third most popular online activity in the
U.S. (Fox, 2011). Likewise, practitioners, public health officials,
and other health experts are increasingly turning to ICT—which
provides a means to reach the broadest possible population in the
fastest, easiest, and least expensive manner (Hinton & Hjorth,
2013)—for a variety of purposes. Clinician-to-patient and peerto-peer communication, investing individual patients in their own
care, information exchanges among diverse healthcare and public health stakeholders, and detecting and managing disease outbreaks have been transformed through ITC (Charles-Smith et al.,
2015; Grajales et al., 2014; Kreps & Neuhauser, 2010; Rice & Sara,
2018). While this situation may appear overwhelmingly positive,
some aspects of ITC use and its popularity remain problematic.
First, ITC use has altered the dynamics between health experts
and the patients and populations they serve (Hawn, 2009). Social
media in particular has provided a mechanism for laypersons to
readily share their health-related experiential knowledge with
each other, thus dislodging the centrality of health professionals’
authoritative knowledge in people’s decision-making and behavior
(Hawn, 2009; Househ et al., 2014).
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Second, ITC can, and is, used to spread false information.
Wolfe and associates (2002), for example, found that 32% of antivaccine websites surveyed included pictures of “menacing needles”
and 23% had pictures of children reported to have been harmed or
killed by vaccines. As parents come across these images and their
associated stories this can lead parents to place greater emphasis
on personal and emotional experience rather than scientific evidence. Referred to as false consensus bias in the social psychology
literature, parents may then hesitate to vaccinate or reject vaccines
for their children altogether.
What is particularly challenging in regard to social media is
that such images and negative stories tend to have a greater impact
than facts and positive messages. In their research of vaccinationrelated YouTube videos, for example, Keelan and associates (2007)
found that while the majority (48%) of the 153 identified videos promoted vaccination and only 32% were negative toward
vaccination, the most liked and viewed were the ones with negative content. The lowest rated and watched videos were provaccination public service announcements.
These positive and negative aspects of ITC, in turn, influence
what practitioners and the broader public understand about MCM
safety and efficacy, thus presenting new challenges and opportunities for crisis and risk communicators. Medication users, for example, are increasingly sharing personal knowledge and experience
of drug benefits and risks via online disease support networks,
patient and drug forums, and microblogging (Matsuda, 2017;
Sloane et al., 2015). Through social media, these individuals can
find both practical information and a sense of community, while
drug safety professionals have a new, rich data source with which
to mine for potential evidence of adverse events, supplementing
uneven healthcare provider reports (Edwards & Lindquist, 2011;
Inch et al., 2012).
At the same time, great potential exists for the public to
encounter misleading or dangerous information about pharmaceuticals, as non-expert consumers deliver their own drug product
testimonials and illegal online pharmacies promote their services
via social media (Tyrawski & DeAndrea, 2015). Misinformation is
proving especially challenging in connection with vaccines where
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social media users encounter disproportionate negative reporting
and images, are more swayed by personal narratives about vaccination’s adverse effects than the science, and tend to judge disparate ideas about vaccines as equally valid, regardless of expertise
(Guidry et al., 2015; Kata, 2012; Poland et al., 2009; Witteman &
Zikmund-Fisher, 2012). Thus, in this current ITC-rich environment, good communication, and good training for effective communication, is critical.

Methods
To develop the SPARS scenario a project team with expertise in a
variety of areas, including epidemiology, public health preparedness, risk communication, and the biological and social sciences,
was assembled. Utilizing these diverse perspectives, the team used
a combination of the inductive and deductive heuristics delineated
by Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004) to develop the scenario premise
(Figure 1). This process began with selecting the timeframe for the
scenario—the years 2025–2028. These dates, which were 10–13
years in the future at the time, were chosen to provide a timeline
that allowed the development of future possibilities, but was not
so far in the future as to make the scenario become a work of science fiction. After the timeframe was established, the project team
turned to the focal question: What emergency communication
issues around MCM are most likely to exist 10 years from now?
To begin answering this question, the project team considered the key economic, environmental, political, social, and technological factors they felt were likely to emerge by 2025. Factors
considered by the project team included prominent ones such as
technological advances like the proliferation of tools to access the
internet, increased use of the internet for things like social media
and telemedicine, greater political and social polarizations, changing demographics in the United States including an aging baby
boomer population, and climate change and urbanization that
could result in the (re)emergence of zoonotic diseases.
After careful discussion of each of these factors, which included
consideration of existing literature and theoretical approaches, the
team considered which factors seemed inevitable given present
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FIGURE 1 The scenario generation process, adapted from Ogilvy and
Schwartz (2004).
#1 - Identify focal issue and
time frame

Single out a key decision or a strategic
uncertainty that has long-range consequences
important to the organization

#2 - Brainstorm a list of "key
drivers"

Consider notable forces shaping and
influencing the focal issue: social,
technological, economic, natural, political

#3 - Sort "drivers" into
"predetermined trends" and
"critical uncertainties"

Distinguish inevitable trends that will play out
the same no matter what *versus* important
trends whose impacts are unsure

#4 - Select top 2 "critical
uncertainties" and build 2x2
scenario matrix

Reduce each critical uncertainty to an axis
with polar cases at each extremity; overlay
the 2 axes and produce 4 futures to explore

#5 - Select 1 of the 4 futures
and elaborate on a complete
storyline
Deepen the plot through
systems thinking

Think of critical events, then delve into underlying patterns and structures that these events
signal; use diagrams to see how forces interact

Tell a story with a beginning,
middle, and end

Capture time and causality dimensions; first
this, then that; generate a series of headlines
describing events over the course of the scenario

Create characters

Personify the magnitude and direction of
change by using real or iconic figues

Employ standard plot lines

Build on common narratives ("winners and
losers" and "David and Goliath")

# 6 - Refine the plot through an
iterative process of reflection,
research, and revision
#7 - Explore the strategic
implications of the scenario

Return to initial focal issue to determine
gaps, vulnerabilities, options facing the
organization
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conditions and which were the most likely to impact the direction
of the scenario. From this process, two critical uncertainties were
identified: the extent of access to information technology, that the
team felt was inevitable, and the degree of fragmentation among
populations along social, political, religious, and cultural lines,
which the team felt would lead to novel communication issues. The
project team then used these uncertainties to construct a scenario
matrix illustrating the four possible futures that could be shaped
by these trends (Figure 2). After careful consideration, the team
ultimately chose the “echo-chamber”—a world comprised of isolated and highly fragmented communities with widespread access
to information technology—as the future in which the prospective
scenario would take place.
FIGURE 2 Final Scenario Framework: Four possible futures in which the
SPARS pandemic unfolds.
Unbridled access and openness to information technology (including social
media)
Isolated
communities,
social
fragmentation

“Echo-chamber”

“UN Security
Council”

“Solitary
Confinement”

“Shangri-La”

Diverse but
integrated
communities,
“melting pot”

Erratic, unequal access to information technology (including social media)
“Echo-Chamber”—a technologically savvy, plugged in, but fragmented
society in which groups that hold diverse worldviews consume information
that continues to validate their own positions, allowing them to live in their
own mental bubble; government agencies and citizens alike have ready
access to all the latest informational tools.
“Solitary Confinement”—a society (including general population and public
sector) with an uneven access to informational technology (due to lack
of net neutrality, uneven infrastructure) that isolates differently minded
communities.
“UN Security Council”—a technologically savvy, plugged in society where
diversity reigns, but difference and tolerance are socially valued, and where
information flows freely across different groups.
“Singapore”—a melting pot society, with peaceful co-existence of differently
minded groups, but uneven levels of access to information technology.
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From this point, scenario-specific storylines were developed,
drawing on the subject matter expertise of the project group,
interviews with expert working group (EWG) members associated
with the larger project, historical accounts of past MCM crises,
contemporary media reports, and scholarly literature in sociology,
emergency preparedness, health education, and risk communication. This process allowed the project team to identify expected
and new communication dilemmas to include in the scenario. As
one example of this, the project team considered how the internet
and social media affect the social dynamics of health communication. Using the theory of false consensus bias and the findings on
vaccination in social media (described previously in the literature
review section), the project team identified specific communication dilemmas to include in the scenario. One of these involved
responding to a particularly emotional video that was widely
spread via social media and then maintained in the public view for
months afterward by teenagers who enjoyed the shock value of the
images. This specific case, titled “Going Viral,” is presented later in
this paper.
Once different dilemmas were identified, the team considered
how the different storylines could reasonably fit together and what
characters were necessary in order for these events to occur. An
outline for the scenario was then constructed using newspaper
and other social media headlines as markers for key events; in
many instances, these remained in the scenario in order to introduce the different dilemmas. Finally, the entire storyline was written in draft form as if the SPARS outbreak had occurred in the
recent past, allowing some outcomes and conclusions to be drawn
within the scenario.
From this point, scenario development entailed a recursive
process of continued research and analysis by the project team,
review and feedback from EWG members (summer 2015), and
two rounds of external review by authorities on risk communication and the MCM enterprise (four individuals in fall 2015, three
individuals in summer 2017). Comprising the project EWG were
risk and crisis communication scholars; MCM developers, producers, and regulators; practitioners in medicine, public health,
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and pharmacy science; and experienced public health emergency
managers at all levels of government. Revisions were made after
each review in order to increase the accuracy and usefulness of the
material presented in the scenario.
The final product, referred to hereafter as the SPARS scenario,
is not intended to be a crystal ball of things to come; rather, it is
meant to serve as a plausible narrative that illustrates a broad range
of serious and frequently encountered challenges in the realm of
risk and crisis communication. To increase the usefulness of the
scenario, each response- and recovery-phase dilemma is followed
by food for thought questions that are meant to prompt readers,
reading as individuals or in training groups, to consider how they
might respond to similar situations or how they might prevent
similar problems or classes of problems from occurring in the first
place. Like the studies of scenario-driven exercises (Skryabina et
al., 2017) show, including those featuring emergency risk communication (Miller et al., 2017), the SPARS scenario is intended to
prepare users for mitigating public health emergencies and managing MCM communication dilemmas more effectively. In the
following sections, we outline the scenario environment and how
the fictional outbreak begins. We then provide excerpts of two
dilemma sections as examples of the larger document.

The SPARS Scenario: An Introduction
Scenario Environment
The setting of SPARS is the world in 2025–2028. For this time
period, the project team imagined a world that is simultaneously
more connected and yet more divided. There is nearly universal access to wireless internet for even the poorest persons in the
United States. Additionally, technological innovations and competition between technology companies have made an even wider
range of information technology readily available to all. Despite
the possibilities for these advancements to facilitate broad communication between individuals and communities, the project team
also envisioned a future where many have chosen to self-restrict
the sources they seek for information, often electing to interact
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only with those whom they agree with on significant issues. This
trend increasingly isolates cliques from one another, making communication across and between these groups more difficult.
In relation to MCM communication more specifically, government agencies like the CDC have increasingly adopted social
media technologies, including long-existing platforms such as
Facebook, Snapchat, and Twitter, as well as emerging platforms
like ZapQ—an interface that enables users to aggregate and
archive media content from other platforms and communicate
with cloud-based social groups based on common interests and
current events. Federal and state public health organizations have
also developed agency-specific applications and ramped up efforts
to maintain and update agency websites.
Challenging this technological grip, however, are the diversity
of new platforms and the speed with which social media communities evolve. Moreover, while technologically savvy and capable,
these agencies still lag in terms of their “multilingual” skills, cultural competence, and ability to be present on all forms of social
media. These agencies also face budget constraints, which complicates their efforts to improve public communications efficiency
and effectiveness by increasing their presence in existing and
emerging social media platforms.
SPARS
After much consideration of possible emergency situations that
would require MCM use, the project team decided on setting the
storyline around a novel coronavirus that caused a mild, flu-like
disease in most instances, but pneumonia and/or hypoxia requiring hospitalization and extensive medical treatment in a small
minority of cases. The project team named this fictional pathogen
the St. Paul Acute Respiratory Syndrome Coronavirus, or SPARS
for short, because in the scenario it is first identified in St. Paul,
Minnesota.
Two features of this disease are important to note because they
impact how the storyline of the scenario plays out, as well as some
of the communication dilemmas that occur. First, the project
team decided to make SPARS have an extended incubation period
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(7 to 10 days) but a short latent period (4 to 5 days). This complicates the scenario because infected persons in the story are capable
of spreading the virus for up to 6 days before showing symptoms
of the disease themselves. This feature of SPARS makes isolation
procedures in the scenario, like urging people to stay home if
they think they might be sick, less effective than what is typically
expected for airborne pathogens and thus introduces novel dilemmas in the storyline. Second, the project team decided to make the
morbidity and mortality from SPARS both significantly higher in
children than adults, and among pregnant women and those with
chronic respiratory conditions. This parallels disease characteristics associated with past disease outbreaks, including the H1N1
pandemic, and allowed for some communication dilemmas from
the past to be revisited under different future circumstances.
In all, the SPARS scenario provides 19 specific storylines, and
an associated 23 communication dilemmas for readers to consider.
An outline of the entire storyline is available in Table 1, and a list
of the communication dilemmas provided in the scenario can be
found in Table 2. The following sections provide excerpts of two
dilemmas included in the scenario as well as their associated communication dilemmas and food for thought questions.
TABLE 1 Timeline of Events in the “SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028”
Scenario
2025
October 	The first US deaths occurred due to SPARS. Initially, these
deaths were thought to have been caused by influenza.
November	Cases of SPARS were reported across Minnesota and in six
other states.
	Thanksgiving holiday travel and Black Friday shopping
facilitated spread of SPARS beyond the Midwest (26 states
and multiple other countries by mid-December).
	The WHO declared the SPARS pandemic to be a Public Health
Emergency of International Concern.
December	No treatment or vaccine for SPARS existed, but there was
some evidence that the antiviral Kalocivir could be effective
as a therapeutic.
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	A proprietary vaccine developed and manufactured by a
multinational livestock conglomerate (GMI) was proposed
as a potential foundation for a human vaccine. The vaccine
was developed to combat an outbreak of a similar respiratory
coronavirus in hooved mammal populations in Southeast
Asia, but the vaccine had not been licensed by any regulatory
authority or tested in humans. There were concerns over
potential side effects.
2026
January	The US government contracted CynBio to develop and
produce a human SPARS vaccine based on the GMI animal
vaccine.
	The HHS Secretary invoked the Public Readiness and
Emergency Preparedness Act (PREP Act) to provide liability
protection for the vaccine manufacturer and providers.
Congress authorized and appropriated emergency funds
under the PREP Act to provide compensation for potential
adverse side effects from the vaccine.
	Following reports of Kalocivir’s limited success in treating
patients with severe SPARS infections, the FDA issued an
Emergency Use Authorization (EUA) for the antiviral. Kalocivir
had been evaluated as a therapeutic for SARS and MERS,
and several million doses were maintained in the SNS, which
could be deployed as necessary while production capacity
was established to meet demand.
	The FDA, CDC, and NIH provided seemingly conflicting
communications regarding the safety and efficacy of
Kalocivir.
	In the United States, public anxiety around SPARS resulted in
extensive use of Kalocivir, frequent self-reporting of SPARS
symptoms, and a surge in demand for medical care.
	By late January SPARS was detected in 42 countries and all US
states.
February	A lack of cultural competency in FDA and other
governmental communication became apparent among
various ethnic groups in the United States.
	A video of a 3-year-old vomiting and fainting after taking
a dose of Kalocivir was widely and rapidly spread via social
media, strengthening opposition to the EUA.

The SPARS Pandemic 2025–2028

85

	The UK Medicines and Healthcare Products Regulatory
Agency and the European Medicines Agency jointly
authorized the emergency use of a new antiviral, VMax, in the
United Kingdom and throughout the European Union. Some
Americans attempted to gain access to VMax online or by
traveling to Europe.
April	The CDC publicized an updated (and significantly lower) case
fatality rate in the United States; the perception of lesser risk
triggered a drop in public interest.
May	Production of Corovax, the SPARS vaccine produced by
CynBio, was well underway.
	Federal agencies initiated a communications campaign using
well-known public figures with mixed results. Polls indicated
a 15–23% increase in SPARS and Kalocivir knowledge
nationwide. Hip-hop icon BZee had success promoting
public health messaging with an online video clip, but he
lost credibility when he compared volunteers for Corovax
trials with “volunteers” from the Tuskegee syphilis study.
Similarly, former President Bennett provided a non-committal
response when asked if she would want Kalocivir for her new
grandson.
	Public health agencies discovered that a relatively new social
media platform, UNEQL, was being used as a primary means
of communication in college-aged populations.
June	Corovax entered the final stage of its expedited review, and
production capacity was increased. Ten million doses were
expected to be available by July with fifty million more in
August.
	The CDC Advisory Committee on Immunization Practice
(ACIP) announced vaccine priority groups. Healthcare
providers were not included as a priority, inciting protests by
doctors and nurses across the country.
	In order to prioritize distribution of limited Corovax supply,
the federal government requested that states report
summary information for patient electronic health records
(EHRs) to estimate the number of individuals in high-risk
populations. This effort was met with resistance from the
public, who protested the federal government accessing their
private medical information.
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July	A week prior to initiating the nationwide vaccination
program, damage to a power grid in the Pacific Northwest
resulted in a widespread power outage that lasted two
weeks. State and local public health agencies initiated
communications programs using posters and flyers to
promote the vaccination program in the absence of
electronic media.
	Social media efforts across the country promoted the
vaccination campaign, and crowdsourced data helped to
increase efficiency in distributing the vaccine.
August	The Corovax vaccination program met resistance from several
groups: alternative medicine proponents, Muslims, African
Americans, and anti-vaccination activists. Initially operating
independently, these groups banded together via social
media to increase their influence.
September	Japan announced that it would not approve Corovax for
use in Japan in favor of developing and producing its own
vaccine.
October	College students predominantly on the East and West coasts
staged protests against the unequal global availability of
Corovax. Vaccination rates among these students were below
average for college students in other areas of the country.
November	The anti-anti-vaccine movement, formed in the wake of the
2015 measles outbreak in the United States, reignited their
efforts to combat the anti-vaccination super-group. The
FDA, CDC, and other federal agencies also redoubled their
communications efforts to promote the Corovax campaign.
	An increasing number of post-SPARS pneumonia cases were
reported across the country.
December	The nationwide vaccination program was expanded beyond
the initial priority populations to include the rest of the
country.
	Federal agencies initiated a vaccination communication
program involving targeted online advertisements.
2027
February	Post-SPARS pneumonia cases stressed inventories of
antibiotics across the country. The HHS Secretary authorized
distribution of the oldest lots of antibiotics from the SNS to
supplement the antibiotic supply nationwide.
	Tests of antibiotics in the SNS inventory determined that 94%
of the remaining antibiotics in the oldest lots maintained
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	sufficient potency. Tests conducted in August 2026 provided
the basis for extending the expiration of these lots from 2027
to 2029.
March	Rumors spread via traditional and social media that the
government was dispensing expired antibiotics.
	Alyssa Karpowitz, a leader in the natural medicine movement,
sought medical care at an emergency department after
natural remedies failed to resolve her son’s bacterial
pneumonia. After successful treatment with proper
antibiotics from the SNS supply, she touted the benefits of
“expired” antibiotics in her social media circles.
April	Crowd-sourced and independent epidemiology analysis of
Corovax side effects conflicted with official federal reports.
The independent analyses gained popularity in traditional
and social media due to visual presentation and interactive
content. Government attempts to respond with data and
press releases largely failed.
May	Reports of Corovax side effects began to gain traction. Several
parents of children who experienced neurological symptoms
after receiving the vaccination sued the federal government
and CynBio. The lawsuit was dropped when they learned of
compensation funds available through the PREP Act and the
National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust Fund.
November	Initial reports of long-term side effects of the Corovax
vaccine emerged. These reports arose primarily from those
in the initial priority (high-risk) populations and were few
in number. With little available data and numerous preexisting conditions, initial studies were unable to identify a
statistically significant association with any long-term effects.
Claims for compensation were placed on indefinite hold until
further data could be gathered and analysis completed.
	In response to public demand for long-term side effect
compensation, the HHS Secretary invited Congress to
conduct an independent investigation of the federal
compensation process to alleviate concerns of impropriety.
	The public and media pressured Congress to increase the
funds authorized for compensation under the PREP Act.
2028
August	The SPARS pandemic was officially declared to be over;
however, experts remain concerned about domestic animal
reservoirs and the potential for future outbreaks.
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TABLE 2 Emergency Communication Dilemmas Featured in the “SPARS
Pandemic 2025–2028” Scenario
Response Phase
▶▶ Engendering public trust and a sense of self-efficacy when a crisis is still
evolving and critical health information is incomplete
▶▶ Responding to public and political pressure to share information about
potential MCMs in the development pipeline even though information
may be incomplete or proprietary
▶▶ Maintaining trust in government processes for ensuring the timely
development of safe and effective vaccines when novel threats arise
▶▶ Harmonizing inconsistent messaging across health agencies
▶▶ Appropriately tailoring public health messages to address the concerns
and culture of specific communities
▶▶ Responding to the power of graphic images of a child in distress: one
story that is elevated to a population-level problem
▶▶ Responding to demand for an alternative antiviral drug not available in
the United States
▶▶ Responding to misinformation or doubt about an MCM generated by a
prominent public figure
▶▶ Overlooking communication platforms used by specific groups; quickly
gaining fluency and effectively engaging the public using a new media
platform
▶▶ Responding to public criticism about potential unequal access to MCMs
like Kalocivir
▶▶ Maintaining public support after changing positions on MCM safety and
efficacy
▶▶ Communicating the need for and reasoning behind the prioritization of
scarce resources
▶▶ Publicizing MCM programs and availability to promote uptake and
efficient distribution
▶▶ Providing real-time data on vaccine availability to align MCM supply with
public demand
▶▶ Maintaining consistent messaging across electronic and non-electronic
media and implementing a secondary communications plan if electronic
media are not available
▶▶ Addressing multiple independent MCM concerns simultaneously
▶▶ Meeting the information needs of citizens who come from diverse
cultural, social, and demographic backgrounds and who may have
varying degrees of trust in health authorities
▶▶ Supporting the current MCM product in the face of opposition from a
foreign regulatory agency
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▶▶ Responding to complex ethical issues that are beyond the United States
government’s control
▶▶ Responding to questions regarding safety and efficacy of drugs that have
extended shelf lives
Recovery Phase
▶▶ Communicating with the public about trustworthy sources of data and
options for legal recourse in a climate of mistrust
▶▶ Bringing a sense of resolution to a period of crisis while striking a balance
between the need to affirm collective grief/loss and the need to move
forward
▶▶ Institutionalizing communications lessons from the 2025–2028 SPARS
pandemic

Response Scenario Excerpt
The following excerpt from the scenario takes place early on
in the pandemic. One month previously the Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) had issued an Emergency Use Authorization
(EUA) for the antiviral Kalocivir. The drug had been evaluated as
a therapeutic for other coronavirus-caused diseases and several
million doses were maintained by the Strategic National Stockpile
(SNS), which meant the drug could be deployed as necessary while
production capacity was established to meet demand. The FDA
and CDC provided information on the drug, but some differences in their messaging caused concern among certain groups
including parents of young children. The specific communication
dilemma this excerpt considers is how to confront the power of a
single graphic image of a child in distress when one story is elevated to a population-level problem.
“Going Viral”
Reports of negative side effects associated with Kalocivir began
gaining traction in February 2026. Despite the negative response,
public health agencies continued to make forward progress until
February 22, when a video of a 3-year-old boy in North Carolina
projectile vomiting immediately after taking a dose of Kalocivir
went viral. In the video clip, the boy swallows a pediatric dose of
liquid Kalocivir, vomits profusely, chokes, and then faints in the
pool of his own vomit while his mother shrieks in the background.
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This clip was widely shared across the United States with a
variety of captions including #AntiviralsDontWork, #DontTake
TheDrugs, and #NaturalCuresAreBetterThanThis. The hashtags,
in turn, provided a way for people sharing these views to find one
another and band together on social media. They formed ZapQ
and other online discussion groups, which allowed them to receive
any messages from group members via smartphones and internet
accessing technology (IAT) instantaneously as they were posted.
Some members of these ZapQ groups even began to use full-sized
(12"×12") IAT screens on the backs of their jackets, coats, and
backpacks to loop the vomiting video for all in their immediate
vicinity to see.
The social media groundswell quickly overwhelmed the capacity of local, state, and federal agencies to respond, and compliance
with public health and medical recommendations dropped considerably. The FDA and other government agencies quickly attempted
to remind the public that correlation does not equate to causation,
and that vomiting was not a known side effect of Kalocivir. This
message, while scientifically accurate, lacked appropriate empathy
and failed to assuage the public’s mounting fears. As a result, it was
largely ignored, and public concern continued to grow.
In the following weeks, officials from the FDA, CDC, and
other government organizations attempted to promote positive,
accurate information about Kalocivir on several traditional and
social media platforms in order to quell public fear. This messaging, however, was less than optimal both in terms of timing and
dissemination. While the government took several days to provide
an emotionally appropriate message, the spread of the viral video
on social media was exponentially faster. By the time the government responded, most people across the country had already seen
the vomiting video and formed their own conclusions. Additionally, in their responses, governmental organizations were not able
to effectively access all social media platforms. ZapQ groups, for
example, had closed memberships and typically could only be
accessed via invitations from group members.
Both of these issues prompted government organizations to
improve the timing and impact of their social media responses.
While most government agencies, including the CDC and HHS,
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had long-established offices that were directed to coordinate social
media and other communication efforts, the protocols of individual agencies and different agency cultures led to delayed and
sometimes uncoordinated messages.
Despite the many outreach efforts by various government
officials and entities, the government was ultimately unable to
develop a suitable replacement for the initial vomiting video. By
early June 2026, the video had become the most shared Zap clip
among junior high and high school students across the country
who appreciated the shock factor of the video. As a result, the public was continually re-exposed to the anti-Kalocivir message for
several months after the initial incident and subsequent responses.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. Why might communicating the science around MCM adverse
effects alone not be enough to address people’s fears and concerns about an MCM like Kalocivir? Why is it also important
to communicate with compassion, concern, and empathy?
2. To what extent is having sufficiently skilled staff and organizational capacity to communicate via traditional media and
social media platforms critical to influencing public debates
and awareness about an MCM like Kalocivir?
3. What MCM communication challenges are likely to emerge
among up-and-coming youth audiences who are avid consumers of interactive and visual forms of information?
Recovery Scenario Excerpt
The following excerpt from the scenario considers issues related
with recovery, and how to communicate with the public about
trustworthy sources of data and options for legal recourse in a climate of mistrust. At this point in the storyline, Corovax, the FDAapproved vaccine for SPARS, has been released for more than
9 months and the United States is solidly in the recovery phase
of the pandemic. SPARS is now uncommon in the US and public
focus has shifted from the disease to the potential side effects of
SPARS treatments including the Corovax vaccine.
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“Vaccine Injury”
As time passed and more people across the United States were
vaccinated, claims of adverse side effects began to emerge. Several
parents claimed that their children were experiencing neurological symptoms similar to those seen among livestock exposed to
the GMI vaccine. By May 2027, parental anxiety around this claim
had intensified to the point of lawsuits. That month, a group of
parents whose children developed mental retardation as a result of
encephalitis in the wake of Corovax vaccination sued the federal
government, demanding removal of the liability shield protecting
the pharmaceutical companies responsible for developing and
manufacturing Corovax.
The growing plaintiff cohort quickly withdrew their suit upon
learning that the National Vaccine Injury Compensation Trust
Fund (NVICTF) and an emergency appropriation of funds authorized by Congress under the PREP Act existed to provide financial
reimbursement to those who were adversely affected by the Corovax vaccine in order to cover healthcare costs and other related
expenses. Given the positive reaction to the federal government’s
response and the fact that the majority of US citizens willing to
be vaccinated had already been immunized, the negative publicity
surrounding adverse reactions had little effect on nationwide vaccination rates. The focus on adverse side effects, however, resulted
in a considerable increase in the number of compensation claims
filed, and many grew concerned about the long-term effects that
Corovax could have on their health. This concern was particularly
high among some African American parents who continued to
question the government’s motives regarding the Corovax vaccination campaign.
While the FDA, CDC, and other agencies were busy researching possible connections between Corovax and the reported neurological side effects, their efforts were continually undermined by
epidemiological analyses produced by various non-governmental
individuals and groups. The popular science blogger EpiGirl, for
example, began posting interactive maps of the incidence of Corovax side effects in April 2027. To create the maps, EpiGirl collected anecdotes of adverse Corovax side effects using Facebook,
Twitter, and YouTube and combined them with data downloaded
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from the HHS Vaccine Adverse Event Reporting System (VAERS),
a national vaccine safety surveillance program maintained by the
CDC and FDA. EpiGirl also encouraged those among her subscribers who were Apple product users to share health data with
her via Apple’s ResearchKit and HealthKit applications. EpiGirl’s
maps were consequently shared widely in social media circles and
even included in local and national news reports.
The federal government became concerned about the validity
of EpiGirl’s anecdotal data and the widespread sharing of patient
information via the internet. EpiGirl’s data showed a significantly
higher incidence rate of nearly every reported side effect; however, federal officials believed that this was largely due to duplicate entries resulting from compiling data from multiple sources.
Additionally, EpiGirl’s data did not seek to address the cause of the
reported side effects, only the incidence rate. Publication of similar results from organizations such as Patients-Like-Me, a group
closely associated with the natural medicine movement, further
legitimized these independent reports. The government attempted
to respond to these claims through formal press releases, but these
were neither as visually appealing nor as interactive as EpiGirl’s
maps and were, therefore, largely ignored.
Food for Thought Questions:
1. How might advance development and testing of recovery messages that specifically address the topics of adverse side effects
and the NVICTF help improve health authorities’ ability to
respond to public distress about medical issues emerging after
an MCM campaign? What are some messages that would warrant such testing?
2. Despite the uncertain science about the link between Coravax
and the reported neurological symptoms, why should health
officials still communicate with compassion and genuine sympathy toward those in the vaccinated population who experience medical issues subsequent to being vaccinated?
3. Given growing interest in open data systems and the application of “crowd sourcing” to solve complex problems, how

94

BRUNSON, CHANDLER, GRONVALL, RAVI, SELL, SHEARER, and SCHOCH-SPANA

might public health officials take greater advantage of two-way
communication with an interested public in the aftermath of
the SPARS outbreak? For instance, how might input and analysis from members of the public help improve adverse event
monitoring or assess the strengths and weaknesses of a specific
MCM campaign?

Crafting Scenarios: Lessons Learned
Creating the scenario described above was a months-long process
that involved many iterative steps. While the basic process of scenario development is both described above and detailed by others
including Ogilvy and Schwartz (2004), the following are offered as
lessons learned in order to assist in the development and design of
scenarios in the future:
▶▶ Having a project team with different academic backgrounds
(i.e., medicine, public health, and the social sciences) provided
a solid foundation for developing the premise of the future in
which the scenario would take place. Different perspectives,
disagreements, and even lively debates were essential to developing a premise that was both realistic and meaningful. This
process also provided forward momentum for the development of specific storylines.
▶▶ Storyboarding the timeline of events was important to maintaining coherency in the project. In the development of the
SPARS scenario, storyboarding was not a one-time process but
rather an ongoing exercise that occurred throughout scenario
development.
▶▶ As storyboarding was occurring, it was essential to keep in
mind the audiences for the project. In several cases, lessons
specific audiences needed to walk away with were the starting
point; the project team used these to work backward to make
sure those lessons were fully incorporated into the storyline.
▶▶ A focus on small details, including using supporting illustrations like newspaper and social media headlines, was necessary to make the scenario as realistic as possible. This process
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of “sweating the small stuff ” also provided a mechanism for
the project team to check and recheck the accuracy of the overall product.
▶▶ Vetting the scenario with a group of subject matter experts
was critical. In the SPARS scenario, this process helped identify dilemmas that were of particular relevance to specific
target audiences as well as detect plot holes and inaccuracies
that were necessary to fix in order for the storyline to be both
believable and useful.
▶▶ Finally, developing facilitator guides along with the scenario
was a way to increase the facility of the scenario as a teaching
tool.

Conclusion
Effective communication about medical countermeasures—
including drugs, devices, and biologics (e.g., vaccines)—is often
critical in emergency situations. Such communication, however, does not just happen. It must be planned and prepared for.
Prospective scenarios, like the SPARS scenario described in this
paper, offer important opportunities for communication planning
and preparation by enabling readers, both individually and in
discussion with others, to rehearse responses to communication
dilemmas; encouraging readers to envision what the next generation of best practices in MCM emergency communication may
entail, given technological and social trends such as the growing
influence of social media and increasing levels of social isolation;
and prompting readers to consider and prepare for other future
communication dilemma possibilities. In today’s world of rapidlyevolving ICT, such preparation is especially crucial.
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the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA) because it
would allow for the identification of the graduate student complainants. The Kentucky Attorney General sided with the Kernel
and ordered the release of the name-redacted records. To appeal
the ruling, the University sued the paper. In the announcement
of the lawsuit, University President Eli Capilouto acknowledged
the tension of “safeguarding” survivors’ privacy while recognizing
“the need for transparency” (Capilouto, 2016a, para. 1). The Kernel
staff claimed the University was more concerned with protecting
its reputation than its students (Editorial Board, 2016a, 2016b).
Like any organization, institutions of higher education are susceptible to crises, and “higher education leaders face the added
challenge of addressing potential gaps that a crisis may reveal relative to the core values of an institution” (Fortunato et al., 2018,
p. 510). University communicators must protect reputations and
stakeholder relationships (Varma, 2011). Many institutions, such
as the University of Kentucky, are also public entities. Thus, the
crisis can also affect relationships with government agencies and
create an expectation that because it is a public institution, it must
be held to a higher standard (Len-Ríos, 2010).
Despite the recent emergence of crisis communication studies
in sexual misconduct cases on college campuses, Madden (2018)
proclaimed that little research offers guidance for how communicators “can most effectively deal with the gendered and emotional
dimensions” of these issues (p. 596). Survivors cite privacy and
confidentiality concerns as reasons why they choose not to report
incidents (Trades Union Congress [TUC], 2016). The calls for
confidentiality in sexual misconduct cases, which often include a
male perpetrator in a position of power victimizing a female, point
to the notion that privacy is gendered (Higgins, 1999; Roth, 1999).
Researchers have found that “certain issues important to women,”
such as sexual misconduct, “have traditionally been deemed private” (Goldfarb, 2000, p. 1), and judicial procedures involving
these issues are seen more as individual issues than societal issues
(MacKinnon, 1991). Gotell (2006) argued that “the discourse of
privacy has served to mask violence, inequality, and subordination” (p. 747). While arguments for privacy are seemingly made
to protect survivors, keeping sexual misconduct cases private
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perpetuates the victimization of women by not publicly holding
perpetrators accountable for their actions.
The case of University of Kentucky vs. The Kentucky Kernel
exemplifies these challenges as critics attacked the institution over
its lack of transparency and alleged that its misplaced priorities
endangered students. We apply stakeholder theory and the ethics
of justice and care to extend our knowledge of crisis communication in legal crises broadly and sexual misconduct cases specifically. Using a robust case study approach (Sellnow, Littlefield,
et al., 2009), we draw from multiple data points, including interviews with decision-makers at the University of Kentucky and the
Kernel, the University’s official statements, and reports from the
Kernel and other media sources. By speaking with the decisionmakers, this study offers a better understanding of how individuals make decisions in legal crises (Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995), specifically when addressing issues such as privacy and transparency
in sexual misconduct cases.

Literature Review
Crisis Communication in Sexual Misconduct Cases
Crisis communication scholars have identified five primary
response strategies in legal crises: denial, excuse, justification,
concession, and diversion (Benoit, 1995; Coombs, 2007; Huang
et al., 2005). Huang et al. (2005) placed the strategies on a continuum ranging from defensive, which favors organizational interests
and includes denial, to accommodative, where organizations show
concern for victims and invoke concession strategies. Research
suggests legal practitioners favor defensive strategies, advising clients to remain silent (Fitzpatrick & Rubin, 1995; Gibson & Padilla,
1999). Crisis communication scholars emphasize a more accommodative stance including openly and honestly communicating,
along with engaging in corrective action, which could be considered a concession strategy (Seeger, 2006). The tension between
legal practice and crisis research recommendations is evident in
the University of Kentucky sexual misconduct case whereby the
University claimed it could not be transparent and accommodating because of its concern for the legal right of survivor privacy.
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Recent research has focused on legal crisis communication in
sexual misconduct cases on college campuses (Madden, 2018),
including the Duke University lacrosse (Fortunato, 2008; Jin et al.,
2010; Len-Ríos, 2010) and Penn State football cases (Brown et
al., 2015; Formentin et al., 2017). Scholars have emphasized the
importance of identifying “critical stakeholders” during sexual misconduct crises, noting that how these individuals evaluate the university’s response impacts the university’s reputation (Fortunato,
2008). For example, Duke University identified key stakeholder
groups and adjusted its communication strategies depending on
the stakeholder group (Jin et al., 2010). However, Duke’s decision
to refrain from involvement in criminal justice allegations prohibited it from satisfying all of its stakeholders, underscoring the challenge of balancing stakeholder interests during a crisis (Len-Ríos,
2010). In order to further explore the tension between legal crisis
communication and balancing stakeholder interest under the circumstances of sexual misconduct and harassment cases, this study
poses the following research question:
RQ1: What communication strategies did the University employ
in response to the crisis, and how did stakeholders respond?

Managing Stakeholder Interests
To understand how the University of Kentucky attempted to balance stakeholder interests in this case, we turn to stakeholder
theory, which considers how organizations affect and are affected
by groups including customers, employees, the media, and the
government (Freeman, 1984). Crises require the organization
to work with stakeholders to manage outcomes (Ulmer, 2001).
Stakeholders can pressure an organization throughout the crisis
by asking for information, demanding answers, and seeking resolution (van der Meer et al., 2017). Crises that produce conflicting stakeholder desires complicate the response process. Len-Ríos
(2010) contended that universities in particular “must make strategic decisions regarding prioritizing publics” to meet the needs of
their “broad array of constituents” (p. 269).
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A prominent framework introduced to classify stakeholders
is Mitchell et al.’s (1997) theory of stakeholder salience and identification, which offered a typology of stakeholders using three
relational dimensions: urgency, power, and legitimacy. The theory
posits that the more attributes a stakeholder holds, the more salient
the stakeholder becomes from a managerial perspective. Urgency
reflects “the degree to which stakeholder claims call for immediate
attention” (Mitchell et al., 1997, p. 867). Power embodies the ability to convince an organization to do something that it would not
do otherwise (Alpaslan et al., 2009). Finally, a stakeholder wields
legitimacy if their actions or claims about the organization are
“desirable, proper or appropriate” within a social system (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). As the circumstances surrounding the crisis
change, so do stakeholders’ needs and salience.
Other “ethical” approaches to stakeholder management during
a crisis argue that “the decision to include a stakeholder in crisis preparation and response should not be based solely on that
stakeholder’s salience” (Alpaslan et al., 2009, p. 43; Xu & Li, 2013).
Organizations often prioritize certain stakeholders during a crisis, but such action should be taken based on the extent of personal impact (Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). To embrace this “ethical
approach,” organizations must attend to all affected stakeholders (Ulmer, 2001), prioritize stakeholders based on the situation
and shift these priorities as the situation evolves (Xu & Li, 2013),
and make decisions that fairly consider and reflect all stakeholder
interests (Sandin, 2009; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000).
This study thereby proposes the following question:
RQ2:

What stakeholder group(s) did the University prioritize?

Ethical Approaches
To balance competing stakeholder interests, an organization
engages in a decision-making process. But “without an ethical compass to guide its decisions,” an organization may employ strategies
that violate stakeholder expectations (Tao & Kim, 2017, p. 698),
straining its stakeholder relationships and jeopardizing its legitimacy. Two ethical approaches that outline how an organization can
respond to stakeholder pressure are the ethics of justice and care.
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An ethic of justice emerged from social justice theory, which
argues for individuals to be held to universal laws (Rawls, 1971).
An ethic of justice requires that an organization treat all stakeholders fairly by making impartial decisions that recognize the interests of all stakeholders involved in the crisis (Sandin, 2009). The
organization acts objectively and embraces rationality, scientific
approaches, and individual rights (Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017),
drawing upon arguments grounded in logic and objectivity (Kim
et al., 2016). However, scholars have also suggested that using universal rules may not account for nuances in crises, limiting an ethic
of justice’s applicability in crises (Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017).
An ethic of care emphasizes nurturing relationships and
expressing values such as compassion and empathy (Fraustino &
Kennedy, 2018; Kim et al., 2016; Tao & Kim, 2017). This approach
entails “concern about how to fulfill conflicting responsibilities to
different people, as opposed to questions of how to resolve claims
of conflicting rights among them” (Simola, 2003, p. 354). An ethic
of care approach was a critical response to the justice approach
(Simola, 2003; Tao & Kim, 2017). Crafted by Gilligan (1977),
an ethic of care emerged from a feminist perspective, grounded
in Gilligan’s research that found women valued contextual and
relational factors when making moral decisions. Gilligan (1982)
argued a justice-driven approach is too rigid to account for the
complexity of moral dilemmas. An ethic of care “considers the
contextual complexities” of crisis and prioritizes those who have
been affected (Linsley & Slack, 2013; Simola, 2003, p. 354), implying an organization should be involved and remain “sensitive and
responsive to the emotional feelings and needs of publics” (Tao &
Kim, 2017, p. 693). Considering the different ethical approaches
to balancing stakeholder interests, especially in the dynamics of a
crisis, this study poses the following question:
RQ3: How did the University incorporate an ethic of justice and
an ethic of care in its crisis responses?

Methods
This study aims to understand how organizational decisionmakers navigate challenging legal and ethical quandaries while
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illustrating how stakeholder values can conflict with organizational obligations. We used a robust case study approach, which
enables researchers to make claims about a situation using multiple sources of information (Sellnow, Littlefield, et al., 2009). Case
studies are useful when the research examines a current event
by allowing “investigators to retain the holistic and meaningful
characteristics” (Yin, 2009, p. 4) to derive practical implications
(Patton, 2002). This case examines the crisis communication challenges faced by the University of Kentucky when its handling of
a sexual misconduct case generated allegations that it was acting
irresponsibly.
For data triangulation, we included statements released by the
University of Kentucky on uknow.uky.edu (n = 7), emails from the
University president to faculty, staff, and students (n = 3), articles
published by the Kernel (n = 47) and local newspaper The HeraldLeader (n = 32), and articles culled in a Google News search using
the terms “University of Kentucky,” “Kernel,” and “sexual misconduct” (n = 45). All documents were collected from April 6,
2016, when the Kernel published its first article, to May 17, 2019,
when the Appeals Court ruled in favor of the Kernel. After receiving approval from the Institutional Review Board, we conducted
face-to-face interviews with four individuals who were involved in
decision-making processes. These individuals were the unnamed
member of the University of Kentucky’s legal counsel, who provided legal advice during the case; Jay Blanton, the executive
director of public relations and marketing, who handled media
inquiries on behalf of the University; Marjorie Kirk, the former
Kernel editor, who wrote many of the stories about the case and
made decisions about what information to publish; and Chris
Poore, the former Kernel advisor, who said he offered advice to
student journalists but allowed them to make the final decisions.
All participants except legal counsel consented to have their names
included in the write-up of the study.
We used semi-structured interviews to compare answers across
the sample, adjusted questions based on the interviewers’ affiliation (the University or the Kernel), and asked follow-up questions
(Patton, 2002). Questions for participants from the Kernel focused
on the staff ’s concern with the University’s public response, how
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it expressed these concerns to administration, and the challenges
the staff faces in covering sexual misconduct cases. Questions for
University decision-makers centered on the factors that influenced the University’s public response to the case, the challenges
the University faced when communicating about these types of
cases, and how maintaining the University’s reputation factored
into these decisions. Interviews ranged from 41 to 98 minutes and
were audio-recorded with permission from the participants.
After collecting data and transcribing the interviews, we conducted textual analysis (Creswell, 2013). First, all data were read
to achieve a holistic understanding of the case while making initial notes and observations. Second, the data were re-read multiple
times to form preliminary codes, which were grouped and placed
into larger categories or themes, combining codes as needed to
avoid duplication. Finally, a reading of the data was conducted to
ensure all evidence supported its assigned theme. The resulting
analysis is described next.

Case Background
In February 2016, a University of Kentucky professor signed a resignation agreement following a sexual misconduct investigation
comprising three allegations, two complainants, and five survivors.
The case (Table 1) began when a spokesperson representing two
female survivors approached then-Kernel reporter Marjorie Kirk
(Kirk, personal communication). At first, the paper could only
report on the settlement statement shared by the University, which
refused to release the full report (legal counsel, personal communication), claiming it would “constitute an unwarranted invasion
of personal privacy” (Smith, 2016, para. 5). Revoking tenure can
take years. The University’s push for resignation offered a quick
solution, but once the accused leaves the university, the inquiry
essentially ends (Kirk, 2016b). Because many settlements prohibit disclosing the incident to future employers, the “passing the
trash” practice permits faculty to move without public knowledge
of accusations (Rexroat, 2017). The survivors feared the professor
would repeat the behavior at another institution (Kirk, personal
communication).
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TABLE 1 Timeline of Events
February 2016

Accused professor signs an agreement with the
University of Kentucky (Smith, 2016).

March 2016

Two survivors approach Kirk regarding their
concerns with the settlement (Westerman, 2017).

April 2016

The Kernel publishes its first article on the case and
asks the University for records pertaining to the
case (Kirk & Wright, 2016).
The University provides a letter of the investigation.
The Kernel files an appeal with the Attorney
General’s office to release the documents (Smith,
2016).

August 6, 2016

The Attorney General rules the University should
release the documents but redact the names and
identifiers of the complainants and witnesses (News
Staff, 2016).

August 8, 2016

The University announces its decision to sue the
Kernel as part of the appeals process (Kirk & Wright,
2016).

August 13, 2016

The Kernel obtains 122 pages of records from a
confidential source representing the two survivors
(Kaufman, 2016).
The University confirms its decision to proceed with
the lawsuit.

August 31, 2016

The University files suit against the Kernel.

September 10, 2016

University of Kentucky President Eli Capilouto
claims the Kernel publishes “salacious details to
attract readers” (Blackford, 2016b, para. 12).

September 17, 2016

Journalism faculty ask Capilouto to apologize to
Kirk over his “salacious” comment and drop the suit
(Stripling, 2016).

October 2016

The Kernel wins The Pacemaker Award (Blackford,
2016b).

November 2016

Two survivors “switched their stance” and joined suit
with the University (Blackford, 2016d).

January 2017

Circuit court judge rules in favor of the University in
lawsuit, claiming the organization does not have to
hand over records to the Kernel (Blackford, 2017).
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August 2017

Circuit court judge upheld the previous ruling from
January (Blackford, 2017).

June 2018

President Capilouto announces that the University
finalized all changes for disciplinary processes for
allegations including sexual assault (“UK updates
policy,” 2018).

May 2019

Court of Appeals rules that the University violated
the state’s Open Record Act, sides with Kernel
(Cheves, 2019).

Early media coverage was impeded by the University’s decision to only provide the settlement statement, reportedly frustrating two survivors (Kirk, personal communication). Kirk and the
then-editor of the Kernel filed an open records request with the
Attorney General (Kirk & Wright, 2016), who ruled the University
should release the documents to the Kernel and the Attorney General’s office but redact the names and identifiers of complainants
and witnesses (News Staff, 2016). The University declined and, in
accordance with state law, announced it would sue the paper to
appeal the decision, leading the two survivors to give several pages
of redacted records to the Kernel (Kirk, personal communication).
Kirk warned the survivors that “this story’s probably going to take
off,” anticipating the local newspaper would be interested but not
that it would quickly gain national attention (personal communication).

Findings
RQ1: University Response and Stakeholder Reactions

Secrets “stain” the university’s image. The University applied the
excuse strategy by using provocation, presenting its actions as the
appropriate legal response (Huang et al., 2005). Following an allegation, the University must investigate. If the investigation reveals
an incident did occur, the University initiates a three-step process:
stop the activity, mitigate the effects, and ensure it never happens
again “on our campus” (legal counsel, personal communication).
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The University must provide due process and can only remove the
accused (legal counsel, personal communication). According to
University spokesperson Jay Blanton, settling was the fastest way
to legally remove the threat, even if it “was imperfect” (personal
communication). The University also sued the Kernel to avoid
releasing the redacted documents, which it said contained enough
information to identify the complainants and witnesses. Blanton
recognized the courts were necessary to reconcile the competing
tensions of transparency and privacy (personal communication),
and University legal counsel added that “naming the Kernel is a
quirk of Kentucky law. Our dispute is with the Attorney General”
(personal communication).
The case gained national media attention (Kaufman, 2016),
even though the University’s decision to sue is a common practice
between journalists and public institutions according to Kernel
advisor Chris Poore (personal communication). Some stakeholders supported the University, including on-campus survivors’
advocacy group SPARC, which argued that transparency should
not jeopardize survivors’ “privacy and dignity” (Melanson, 2016,
para. 22). But conveying the legalities of the situation proved problematic as the University’s proclaimed desire to protect individuals
was overshadowed by claims that it “is fighting for secrecy, not for
privacy. It is fighting for itself, not for victims” (Editorial Board,
2016b, para. 32).
A local journalist claimed nearly all the media attention was
critical (Blackford, 2016d). The Kernel called the case “a stain on
the University’s image” (Editorial Board, 2016a, para. 20), and
external agencies deemed it “embarrassing” (Merlan, 2016, para.
2). The Kernel accused the University of hiding information (Editorial Board, 2016a) and safeguarding its own image (Editorial
Board, 2016b). Reporters highlighted the University’s status as
a public institution, contending this position made its behavior
more egregious (News Staff, 2016). This veil of secrecy was fed by
what Poore labeled “the Blanton funnel” (personal communication). Poore expounded that “You only have one source for a story
on campus. That’s Jay Blanton,” which often produces a “washed
out” rather than “accurate version of the story.” Kirk added that for
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the majority of the case, only Blanton’s office would speak with the
Kernel, which she felt made it appear as though the University was
“responding to a public image concern, not an administrative or a
disciplinary concern” (personal communication).
Following legal precedent or hiding behind the law? The University attempted to act with good intentions by citing the Family
Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA). Because the University receives federal funds, it must adhere to the federal law,
which “precludes us from revealing educational records without
the consent of everyone involved” and broadly defines an educational record “as essentially any document maintained by the
University that relates to a student” (legal counsel, personal communication). According to legal counsel, the law required the University to retain all records, even if redacted. The ability to access
information online also influenced the University’s decision as
administration determined it was “effectively impossible” to redact
all identifying details (legal counsel, personal communication)
and feared the justice system could not guarantee confidentiality
to prevent retaliation (Westerman, 2017). University legal counsel
emphasized it acted “with guidance from the U.S. Department of
Education in 2006,” which stated “you cannot turn over FERPA
protected documents to a State Attorney General in the context of
an open records dispute” (personal communication). Legal counsel added that the University provided a description of the documents to the Attorney General.
Citing FERPA added a new tension. Critics stated the University overstepped its bounds as the decision about what documents
can be released “is the job of the legal system, not the University
President” (Editorial Board, 2016b, para. 23). Others argued the
use of FERPA made the University the “latest example of colleges
hiding behind student privacy laws to protect their image and reputation” (New, 2017, para. 3). Both Kirk and Poore claimed other
universities provided documents in similar cases and were not
punished (personal communication).
Blanton and the legal counsel were “disappointed” that media
coverage never noted the complexity of the University’s decision
as “there never seemed to be an acknowledgment that the University wasn’t just making this up. We were, in effect, following

Balancing Transparency and Privacy in a University Sexual Misconduct Case

115

well-established law” (legal counsel, personal communication).
Blanton also claimed the media failed to recognize the University’s precarious situation by including “scant” mention of the
legal-privacy tension and disproportionately focusing on the open
records debate (personal communication). Conversely, the Kernel frequently questioned why administrators would not release a
redacted report as a form of compromise (Editorial Board, 2016a;
Kirk, 2016a). Kirk claimed names and event descriptions are
unnecessary as “you would just need to know that [the professor]
was found responsible by his employers for doing this, this, and
this . . . That page has nothing on it that you could even argue was
an education record” (personal communication).
The university’s redaction blunder. The survivors later changed
their stance and sided with the University as the case gained
national attention, believing that “the line between the laudable
goal of transparency and the blatant invasion of privacy has been
crossed” (Blackford, 2016d, para. 3). But this turn of events was
overshadowed by a University gaffe. At its Board of Trustees meeting, the University distributed letters written by the survivors
expressing their “dissatisfaction” with the media coverage, but
when removing identifying information, overlooked one reference
that identified a survivor (legal counsel, personal communication).
Kirk, who attended the meeting, caught the mistake and brought it
to the attention of Blanton (Kirk, personal communication), who
swiftly collected the letters and later apologized to the survivors
(Blanton, personal communication). The media capitalized on the
mishap, emphasizing that “UK is the only one that has identified a
victim by name” (Editorial Board, 2016b, para. 20).
Selling salacious news. During the same Board of Trustees
meeting, President Eli Capilouto escalated criticism when he stated
that “In printing salacious details to attract readers, they [the Kernel] have effectively identified the victim survivors” (Blackford,
2016b, para. 12). Blanton explained that Capilouto meant not all
details need to be included to print the story (personal communication). Nevertheless, the damage was done, and Capilouto’s use
of the attacking the accuser strategy backfired. Many saw his comment as a direct attack on Kirk. Even though Capilouto did not
explicitly name Kirk, she was the paper’s “decision maker” (Kirk,
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personal communication). For Poore, “UK was fine as they were
arguing it as a policy issue. When Dr. Capilouto made it about the
person, he went way too far” (personal communication).
Journalism faculty at the University penned a letter requesting an apology (Stripling, 2016). Capilouto refused, arguing that
“to have a student newspaper provide so much information in an
article that anybody in 15 minutes could most likely identify the
victims of assault” is “a serious matter” (para. 47). Kirk said she
conferred with the survivors about the details included in the articles, such as the professor’s behavior at conferences, and received
their approval (personal communication). Poore explained that
without those details, the survivors feared that “people wouldn’t
realize the setting he had done that in” and thus, assertions that
they could be readily identified “was pretty unfair treatment” of
Kirk (personal communication).
Corrective action. The University invoked concession by
announcing systemic changes. Early on, administrators used corrective action by declaring that it would require new faculty members to share their sexual misconduct history and offer training to
graduate students and their mentors (Capilouto, 2016b). The University also introduced a process for reviewing faculty behavior
following “clear examples of sexual misconduct” (para. 11). Yet,
thus far, a required training session has only been offered to graduate students and not their faculty advisors. While other steps,
such as the revised disciplinary process, show commitment to
addressing University members’ “concerns and suggestions” (“UK
updates policy,” 2018, para. 2), it must implement all of its plans
to address the “passing the trash” problem at the university level.
RQ2: Stakeholder Priorities

The University publicly identified its salient stakeholders to be
(1) the survivors, and (2) current students. The University of
Kentucky maintained its decisions were to protect the survivors’
privacy while adhering to legal obligations. Legal counsel emphasized the Kernel provided details, such as “the fact that they were
Ph.D. students,” noting that the University posts dissertations
online with advisor names (personal communication). Thus, “If
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you wanted to look back and see how many students got a Ph.D.
in a particular field, you could do so in a matter of moments.” The
University voiced that “truly honoring the value of transparency”
required letting the survivors make decisions about sharing details
(Manouchehri, 2016, para. 12).
First, as part of the University’s three-pronged response to
sexual misconduct (stop, mitigate, prevent), it emphasized that
its responsibility is to survivors, and that removing the threat to
protect these stakeholders was paramount (Blanton, personal
communication; legal counsel, personal communication). Second, the administration claimed that protecting survivor privacy
in this case was necessary to establish a climate where other survivors would feel safe to report incidents. In an email, Capilouto
(2017) asserted that “Without privacy, we know victim survivors
will not come forward to report. That’s what was at stake in this
case” (para. 3).
Critics maintained that the University was prioritizing itself
and neglecting “other students and the public” (Kirk, 2016a, para.
1). The Kernel’s Editorial Board (2016a) offered that the University’s denial of the open records request “showed it cares more about
its own interests than it cares about the law, accountability or the
public’s right to information” (para. 13). Critics also claimed that
the University’s response prioritized the accused over the survivors and other stakeholders. Early on, a spokesperson for the two
survivors argued:
It feels like UK is trying to protect what went on here and to protect
[the professor]. Why not have complete transparency in this? . . . UK
should be interested in protecting not just the students at UK. (UK)
should also be in the interest of protecting students at other universities where [the professor] may end up. (Kirk, 2016a, para. 15)

The Editorial Board (2016b) echoed this claim, asserting that “The
university gives the accused privacy in matters the public has a
right to know” (para. 10).
RQ3: Ethical Approaches

Several of the University’s decisions and communications reflected
an ethic of justice by underscoring fairness, protecting rights of
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all involved parties, and employing legal reasoning. First, Blanton
emphasized that individuals have a right to due process and recognized that the University has a responsibility to create fairness for
the accuser and accused (personal communication). Second, the
University relied on logical reasoning by citing laws, reflecting an
attempt to objectively evaluate a conflict. Although the University
cited FERPA to justify not releasing the records, legal counsel also
explained that “in the sixth circuit, the constitutional right to privacy extends to the details of a sexual misconduct except where
the disclosure of those details is necessary for a criminal prosecution” (personal communication). Thus, “FERPA aside, if instead
of students, these were departmental secretaries or non-students
who were alleging sexual misconduct, we could not as a governmental entity turn that information over.”
Although the University tried to determine what the law
required, Blanton explained that legal codes are “not always 100%
clear. Judgments have to be made” (personal communication).
When making the judgment call, the University “landed on the
side of the victims’ rights to tell their story,” including when and
how (personal communication), permitting it to employ an ethic
of care approach by maintaining that its response was an effort to
do what was right for the survivors. Blanton emphasized that these
decisions were based on the survivors’ needs, claiming the University “cannot—and should not—decide when it is appropriate to
violate a victim-survivor’s privacy—and a victim-survivor’s trust—
by providing information to the Office of the Attorney General, the
Kernel, or any other entity” (Blackford, 2016a, para. 11).
President Capilouto (2016a) underscored relational aspects
when he asserted that “we believe strongly in the need to protect
the privacy of members of our community: our students, patients,
faculty, and staff ” (para. 3). During the Board of Trustees meeting,
he maintained that the University was trying to remain sensitive to
the needs of the survivors and support them:
It is essential that the victim survivors of sexual misconduct know
that their University stands with them, embracing them when they
come forward in the courageous effort at justice and at healing; and
that we will do everything in our power to protect their privacy. . . .
(Melanson, 2016, para. 17)
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Capilouto (2016a) also claimed that the University ponders the
needs of affected stakeholders. He expounded that the University
annually receives hundreds of open records requests and complies
with most, but makes circumstantial decisions when deciding
between transparency or protecting “the privacy and dignity of
individual members of our community” (para. 7).

Discussion and Implications
Madden (2018) claimed university-led discussions about sexual misconduct “call into question who is being valued and why”
and added that “it could become problematic if protecting the
institution and institutional values supersedes the protection of
individuals” (p. 305). This statement captures the essence of the
University of Kentucky case as the administration maintained that
its priorities lay with protecting the privacy of the survivors while
many of its stakeholders, including the Kernel, argued that it was
pursuing self-interest and secrecy. Using stakeholder theory and
ethical approaches, we explore the theoretical applications in this
case before describing the larger social implications and offering
suggestions for practice.
Theoretical Applications
A stakeholder approach. Power, legitimacy, and urgency were
crucial to the case’s evolution (Mitchell et al., 1997). Although the
two survivors reported the professor, leading to his resignation,
no further action occurred at the University level. After publishing a handful of articles and filing the open records request, the
Kernel gained a foothold. Shortly thereafter, the alliance of the
Kernel and two survivors, followed by the newsworthy aspect of
the University’s decision to sue the Kernel, shifted the balance
of power in the favor of the Kernel. Further, the Kernel claimed
its access to the documents, thanks to the survivors, meant the
University’s message “of fighting for the privacy of its victims” fell
apart (Editorial Board, 2016a, para. 20), lending legitimacy to the
paper’s request. The amount of attention given to the case and
stakeholder pressure on the University added a degree of urgency,
pushing it to announce changes to minimize the risk of sexual
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misconduct on campus in September 2016. Although Blanton said
the adjustments were already under review (Horsley, 2016), Kirk
(2016c) claimed the step came “only after the university felt pressure and criticism” (para. 16) from stakeholders.
External media narratives reflected sentiments expressed by
the Kernel, seemingly delegitimizing the University’s stance as
reporters criticized the validity of the legal arguments, portraying
them as “a smokescreen” (New, 2017, para. 14). Some stakeholders
doubted the legitimacy of the institution itself by raising questions
about its values, arguing its actions were irresponsible and tried
“to block sexual assault reporting” (Higdon, 2016, para. 1). Legal
rulings throughout the case also shifted the tide of legitimacy
arguments. In 2017, the University received support when the circuit court ruled in its favor, prompting a sizable decline in external
media coverage. The survivors’ decision to join the University in
the lawsuit after the case received substantial publicity, expressing
concern that disclosing additional records would allow the media
or others to uncover their identities (Blackford, 2016d), and also
altered the trajectory as those who were the most directly affected
by the University’s decisions now stood with it.
Although the Kernel’s persistence in pressuring the University to release the information made it, along with others, a salient
stakeholder, the University refused to budge and relied on an ethical stakeholder argument (Xu & Li, 2013). The administration
fervently maintained that its efforts were to protect those most
affected by the crisis, the survivors, from the onset when the University removed the accused. The University had to operate within
legal parameters that required some details to be withheld while
responding to public pressure to release information. The situation created a legal-ethical tension since releasing information
would place the survivors at risk and, according to the University,
violate federal law. However, withholding the information could
endanger other individuals and violate the Open Records Act. The
University’s unwillingness to release certain documents out of a
proclaimed interest to protect the survivors hindered it from taking action that reflected the interests of all stakeholders (Sandin,
2009; Ulmer & Sellnow, 2000). The University maintained that
it had a legal obligation and a “moral responsibility” to protect
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survivors (Kaufman, 2016, para. 20), but one reporter countered
that it had “a moral and ethical obligation, presumably, to inform
people when a faculty member who might be hired elsewhere
has been accused of something as egregious as this” (Stripling,
2016, para. 33). By withholding the documents, the administration alienated select stakeholders, including the Kernel, some students and faculty, the Attorney General, external media outlets,
and early on, two female survivors. Unable to shield the survivors,
empower third parties to expose the alleged wrongdoing of the
accused, and operate within legal confines, the University simply
could not reconcile all stakeholder interests.
Ethical approaches. The University tried to embrace an ethic
of justice in emphasizing its compliance with the legal system. By
adhering to a universal standard, the University attempted to appear
objective and fair. However, an ethic of justice requires impartiality (Sandin, 2009), and the University also openly claimed to prioritize the survivors and current students over other stakeholders.
A key component of an ethic of justice is the ability to resolve conflicting rights (Simola, 2003), which created a double-bind for the
University as the two values in question were the survivors’ right
to privacy and the public’s right to know. Favoring one came at the
expense of the other, and the situational constraints made it infeasible for the University to employ an ethic of justice.
The University’s announcement to prioritize those who it
perceived to be most affected by the crisis, survivors and current
students, reflected an ethic of care, which accounts for caveats by
recognizing the “particular circumstances of individuals” (Xu &
Li, 2013, p. 382) and acknowledges that organizations may not be
able to resolve stakeholder conflicts (Simola, 2003). By adopting an
ethic of care, the University should have been able to address each
stakeholder group in accordance with its own needs, permitting it
to thoughtfully explain its stance and underscore its value for all
stakeholders. The University adhered to an ethic of care by noting
the situational complexities and vocalizing support for survivor
privacy. However, its use of legal reasoning to defend its position
and the administration’s openly discordant relationship with the
Kernel often left it appearing detached rather than “sensitive and
responsive” to all stakeholders (Tao & Kim, 2017, p. 693). This
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approach fostered a public perception that these stakeholders did
not matter to the University (Editorial Board, 2016c), hindering
it from fulfilling conflicting stakeholder responsibilities (Simola,
2003), and crippling the effectiveness of its crisis response.
Critical Applications
A larger implication of this study reflects the University’s reliance on the value of privacy to protect the survivors, ultimately
illustrating the concerns advanced by feminist legal scholars who
warn that a privacy approach can overshadow the greater issue
at hand (Higgins, 1999; Roth, 1999). Gotell (2006) advanced that
constructing a privacy argument on behalf of complainants creates a paradox as the “public/private divide” can be “deployed
to shield sexual violence from public view” (p. 746). Gotell also
offered that privacy appeals can nurture a systemic problem as this
argument perpetuates the idea that sexual misconduct is a private matter, allowing it to “become individualized and contained
in a moment” (p. 747). Although the case did bring attention to
the systemic shortcoming of “passing the trash” in academia,
this concern was quickly buried by an avalanche of coverage on
the open records debate and lawsuit. The extensive focus on the
privacy-transparency tension prohibited the University and
media outlets from fully illustrating the complexities of the case
and discussing the problems inherent in the justice system and
higher education, which was the crux of the survivors’ decision to
pursue the issue in a public forum in the first place.
Additionally, this case study reflects the fluid dynamics between
media coverage and victim reporting in sexual assault/misconduct
cases. In October 2016, the University claimed that the number of
individuals reporting sexual assault dropped from 59 reports to 38
since the beginning of the case, which it attributed to the extensive
media coverage (Blackford, 2016c). While we do not know that the
media coverage was the catalyst in the reduced number of reports,
this case offers warnings about the effects of extensive coverage
of sexual harassment and assault cases. When the complainants
went to the University’s Title IX office, confidentiality was their
key concern, and one survivor emphasized she wanted to avoid the
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courts to protect her identity because of her career (Westerman,
2017). However, the survivors’ decision to side with the University
as news coverage escalated out of fear that their identities would
be revealed demonstrates the potential costs that survivors may
encounter when they report these crimes. It also suggests that the
substantial attention given to these cases could discourage others
from reporting and preserve a culture of silence.
Practical Implications
This study offers six practical implications for legal crises, and
specifically, sexual misconduct and harassment crises. First, legal
and public relations practitioners should establish relationships
before crises. Blanton recommended practitioners be “at the table”
when decisions are made or they will “be behind” (personal communication). He added that the President’s office, legal counsel,
and public relations team were all involved in drafting messages,
underscoring the need to form an interdepartmental crisis management team and coordinate response efforts (Coombs, 2019;
Seeger et al., 2003).
Second, organizations must maintain a respectful relationship with the media. The administration and the Kernel publicly
disagreed and made scathing comments. Yet, Kirk and Blanton
shared that they respected each other (personal communication).
Kirk and Poore also noted that the University never attempted to
influence the Kernel’s coverage (personal communication). Poore
added that the University gave the paper a “courteous heads up”
before filing the lawsuit and explained that he and Blanton conversed “behind the scenes, trying to solve problems if they were
solvable” (personal communication).
Third, even if organizations cannot supply all details, granting media access to relevant parties, including important actors,
is essential. The University’s reliance on the “Blanton funnel” supported claims in this case that the institution was not being transparent. Some crisis scholars recommend that organizations use
multiple individuals to disseminate a message (Sellnow, Ulmer,
et al., 2009). Issues such as sexual misconduct are complex and
sensitive, and a public relations practitioner may not be the best
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individual to relay messages. The University should have enabled
others to discuss the case, including legal counsel, Title IX officers, members of its Violence Intervention and Prevention Center,
and other administrators. A chorus of voices highlighting different components and delivering more empathetic statements, while
maintaining a consistent narrative, can lend more authenticity and
credibility.
Fourth, organizations must explain situational challenges of
complex legal issues. Legal counsel claimed that the University
attempted to share its legal position in a way that the general public
“would readily understand and appreciate” (personal communication). However, Blanton admitted that the University “struggled”
to share its perspective (personal communication). The University released only seven public statements compared to the Kernel’s
47 articles. Blanton noted the University became more proactive
as the case escalated because “other people are going to tell your
story . . . it’s always better to take the shot first” (personal communication).
Fifth, even though an organization may not be able to pacify all
stakeholders, it should embrace an ethic of care in its responses by
recognizing all concerns. The University’s heavy use of the justification and excuse strategies, along with its reliance on legal reasoning, impeded it from acknowledging stakeholders who questioned
its actions. Fraustino and Kennedy (2018) proposed that organizations should “communicate with these publics from a stance
of care,” particularly when dealing with “vulnerable populations”
(p. 25). An organization should acknowledge and respectfully
engage with all publics, but it may need to prioritize certain stakeholders, such as survivors, during these situations.
Finally, this study advocates for journalists to thoughtfully
cover these cases, underscoring the importance of traumainformed reporting (Gearing, 2019). Kirk explained sensitivity
was “the hardest part” as “I had to make sure I was not going to
cause harm that I could not justify” (personal communication).
For the news media to play its significant role in bringing these
issues to light, news agencies should cultivate a reputation that
ensures survivors are comfortable approaching the outlet because
they know their dignity will be maintained.
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Conclusion
The Kernel and its staff earned national recognition for their
reporting. The Kernel received “The Pacemaker” award, known as
the “Pulitzer Prize of collegiate journalism,” from the Associated
Collegiate Press (Nederhoed, 2016) and the College Press “Freedom
Award” from the Student Press Law Center (SPLC, 2017). Glamour
magazine recognized Kirk as one of its ten “College Women of
the Year” (Harder, 2017). Despite these accolades, in August 2017,
the circuit court sided with the University, ruling the Attorney
General does not have the authority to examine documents if they
are protected under FERPA (Blackford, 2017). In May 2019, the
Kentucky Court of Appeals overturned that decision. Judge Kelly
Thompson, who wrote the three-judge panel’s majority opinion,
stated the University “has taken the indefensible position that the
records are exempt because it says they are and it must be believed”
and requested the University review all documents to identify
those which are not exempt under privacy rule (Associated Press
[AP], 2019, para. 5). The University must then release documents
that can be safely redacted, and explain why withheld documents
are exempt under law (Cheves, 2019).
As stakeholders demand transparency, organizational
decision-makers must identify how to balance information provision and privacy. In the University of Kentucky’s sexual misconduct case, the privacy-transparency tension placed administrators
in a precarious position. By protecting survivor privacy, the University seemingly put other stakeholders at risk, provoking an outcry that the institution favored its reputation over transparency.
This study describes the challenges organizations face when balancing stakeholder interests because of legal restraints or because
interests are irreconcilable. Despite demands for an organization
to be open, this study demonstrates how prioritizing stakeholders
can limit an organization’s ability to be forthcoming, particularly
when the story the public is interested in is not the organization’s
story to tell.
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